Man: Men and Their Master

By HENRY C. POTTER
Bishop of New York

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THE BEDELL LECTURES

Man: Men: and Their Master

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The Bedell Lectures

MAN · MEN AND THEIR MASTER

DELIVERED AT GAMBIER, OHIO
NOVEMBER, 1901

BY

HENRY C. POTTER

EDWIN S. GORHAM
Church Missions House
New York

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Published, November, 1902

THE TROW PRESS, NEW YORK

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EXTRACTS

from the communication of the donors to the Board of Trustees of the Theological Seminary of the Diocese of Ohio and Kenyon College.

CLEVELAND, June 21, 1880.

GENTLEMEN: We have consecrated and set apart for the service of God the sum of $5,000, to be devoted to the establishment of a lecture, or lectures, in the institutions at Gambier on the "Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion; or, the Relations of Science and Religion."

We ask permission of the Trustees to establish the lecture immediately, with the following provisions:

The lecture, or lectures, shall be delivered biennially on Founders' Day (if such a day shall be established), or other appropriate time. During our lifetime, or the lifetime of either of

us, the nomination of the lectureship shall rest with us.

The interest for two years on the fund, less the sum necessary to pay for the publication, shall be paid to the lecturer.

The lecturer also shall be paid one-half of the net profits of the publication during the first two years after the date of publication. All other profits shall be the property of the Board, and shall be added to the capital of the lectureship.

We express our preference that the lecture, or lectures, shall be delivered in the Church of the Holy Spirit, if such building be in existence, and shall be delivered in the presence of all the members of the institutions under the authority of the Board.

We ask that the day on which the lecture, or the first of each series of lectures, shall be delivered, shall be declared a holiday.

We wish that the nomination to this lectureship shall be restricted by no other consideration than the ability of the appointee to discharge the duty to the highest glory of God in the completest presentation of the subject. We desire that the lectures shall be published in uni-

form shape, and that a copy of each shall be placed in the libraries of Bexley Hall, Kenyon College, and of the Philomathesian and Nu Pi Kappa Society. Asking the favorable consideration of the Board of Trustees,

We remain, with great respect,

G. T. Bedell,
Julia Bedell.

The Board accepted the gift, approved the terms, and named All Saints' Day, November 1st, as Founders' Day, and made it a holiday.

MAN: MEN: AND THEIR MASTER

NO. I

THE INDIVIDUAL

MAN · MEN
AND
THEIR MASTER

NO. I

THE INDIVIDUAL

THE founders of these lectures endowed them, to use the term employed in their "communication to the Board of Trustees of the Theological Seminary of the Diocese of Ohio and Kenyon College," for "the establishment of a lecture, or lectures, . . . on the Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion; or, the Relations of Science and Religion."

Since the creation of this Foundation, a science has grown into recognition which, quite possibly, was not in the minds of those who created it; but which, if it is not as yet an exact science, is one which has made, in comparatively a few years, marked strides both as to its proportions and its conclusions. Exist-

ing, originally, if indeed it could then be said to exist, only or mainly as a disconnected group of independent speculations, it has marched with steps that have been somewhat unequal, it is true, but which have many of them been the indices of a remarkable progress, until, to-day —whether or no to its conclusions there can, in strictness, be conceded the name of a science— many of these are of a character so consistent, and an importance so considerable, that it is impossible longer to ignore them.

In these lectures I propose to speak of some of those conclusions, and to indicate, if I may, their relation to those great fundamental truths which are the substance of the Religion of Jesus Christ. Or, rather, and more precisely, I propose to consider, in the light of the principles and precepts of that Religion what, in the threefold aspect of the Individual, the Corporation, and the State, is the relation of that new science which has been called into existence more especially by our modern industrial conditions, and which we call indiscriminately Sociology, or Social Science, to the teaching of Jesus Christ.

In speaking of that science as a modern science, I must not, however, be understood as

implying that nothing answering to it has existed until our own times. To say this would be to imply that, until what we know as our modern civilization appeared upon the stage of history, the races and nations of the world had existed as a disorganized and unrelated mass of human beings without order or law, or mutually dependent and mutually recognized obligations. Than this, in truth, nothing could be more remote from the facts. On the contrary, the oldest and crudest civilizations, taking their earliest types from the constitution of the family, passed, at a very primitive stage of their history, into something answering to an organic state of being. In this there were law, and the enforcement of law; penalty, and the imposition of penalty; the official representative of authority; the limitation of the freedom of the individual; in some more or less feeble and ineffective way, the guardianship of the weak and defenceless; in a word, the whole mechanism that, in a modern State, lifts the savage out of the inferiority and the degradation of his lawless passion and blind self-will, and sets him in the order of a reasoning, law-abiding, equity-loving subject or citizen. It is the story of this achievement,

slow and often difficult as it has been, which in the highest aspect of it makes human history most of all interesting and valuable. And it is the study of this story, in the light of the religion of Jesus Christ, which best prepares the way for the understanding of that problem with which we are here, first of all, concerned—the place of the individual, his rights, duties, and just limitations in the social and especially the industrial order of our modern life.

In approaching it, it is indispensable that we should first of all recognize those ideas and usages on which the earlier order of society rested, and through which it ascended to the plane on which we find ourselves to-day. And, at the outset, we are to note that the primal foundation of authority was force. The constitution of the family, with its progenitors at its head, rested incidentally and, in a certain very real degree, justly, upon this; for, if the father and the mother were to be the protectors of their young, it followed, by an obviously just law, that they should exercise such authority in the way of physical force as limited and conserved the use and waste of that force. And, as the family ascended from the group of fam-

ilies to the tribe, and from the tribe to the State, the pre-eminence of force as determining rulership and sovereignty persisted by a law which was only qualified by the slow growth of intelligence and the progress of that higher civilization which substitutes reason for a blow, reflection for an impulse, and the appeal to the higher intelligence for the application of brute force. How slow that progress was—and, I had almost been tempted to say, is—I do not need to remind you. The survival of war as the court of final appeal in the differences of the civilized world to-day is simply—whether we like to have it called so or not—a survival of this earlier barbarism, which an enlightened social order ought, long ago, to have outgrown.

But since it has not, the halting advance of what we call a Christian civilization need not greatly surprise us. When Christ entered the world, the most perfect form of social order in existence was that of the Roman Empire; and when the Church came in upon the Empire she took over, with a tragic but almost inevitable swiftness, the methods and maxims of the State. The new Religion, when it entered the world, inaugurated no social revolution, but rather

discouraged it. "The powers that be are ordained of God," rang out the clear voice of the Apostle. "Honor all men, love the brotherhood, fear God, honor the king," again he cried; and an age dull and heavy with the long super-imposition of an authority which, whether civil or military, reached down to the humblest man, and laid its hard hand upon the slightest act, heard and construed the words only in their most literal meaning! Indeed, it is no wonder that such an age could not grasp the deeper significance of such language, and discern how it was rather the assertion of a great principle —the principle of an ordered and governed society—and not an *imprimatur* upon the acts of a tyrant and extortioner, or a debauchee. We wonder, now, at the blindness of that large ecclesiasticism which, coming in upon the decadence of the Roman civil power, proceeded straightway to re-enact some of its most arbitrary principles of administration, and lifted back, upon an already tottering throne, the figure of a Pope instead of the corrupt and debased image of a tyrant emperor; but the wonder rather is how, in ages when the individual was so small a figure, and the legion, or the order,

or the army, so familiar a one, it could, at first at any rate, have been otherwise. The student follows down the tract of history from the reign of Trajan to the reign of Pope Paul the Fourth; and all the way along he sees, whatever else he sees, a certain stolid blindness to God's purpose for the individual man, a certain persistent insensibility to the mission of the Gospel as an emancipator of the personal soul and will. "I will make a man more precious than fine gold, even a man than the pure gold of Ophir," had written Isaiah,* long before; but neither Isaiah's time nor those that followed it, all the way down to the sixteenth century of the Christian era, grasped the meaning of that truth. The individual was still an atom in the mass of men, to be the sport of kings, and the servant of the rich and powerful. His independent entity, his personal freedom or responsibility, were things which the great world neither recognized nor acknowledged. He was a slave, a chattel, a tool, but never his own man.

And then there came that tremendous awakening of the slumbering giant which we know indifferently as the *Renaissance*, or, the Ref-

* Chapter xiii. 12.

ormation. Do not mistake me; the two things were neither quite coincident, nor did they spring from quite the same root. It would be more true to say that they were provoked by the same causes, and it would be quite true to affirm that, in a very real though not identical sense, they were informed by the same spirit. For, when one turns back to find out not merely what were the influences that produced that great intellectual movement which stirred Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and which we describe for want of a better name as *Rinascimento*, Renaissance, or Renascence, but what were the aims which it had in view, we find that, at the first view, they are by no means identical with those of the Reformation. The movement which brought about the Renaissance was primarily and pre-eminently an intellectual movement; indeed, it has been common enough to understand by the term what we would understand to-day by the phrase, the Revival of Learning. But it was much more than that. It was the breaking first, undoubtedly, in the domain of letters, and then in art, in philosophy, in science, in the larger sense of the word in politics, with the past. The human mind,

wrapped in the swaddling clothes of that slumbrous past, stretched itself at last and *awoke*. On every hand there was the stir of aroused intelligence, touched first with the incomparable charm of Greek letters, its imagination kindled by the supreme beauty and breadth of vision in Greek poetry, and hesitating as it stood with fascinated feet on the borders of the vast territory of pre-Christian literature, Homer and Plato and Aristotle, as they stretched before it with all their wealth of insight and suggestiveness; and then, beyond measure, stirred and quickened by the breath of a new life which the voices of these great teachers breathed into men's starved and sterile minds. But while all this was true, in connection with the era of the Renaissance, first and most in the domain of letters, it was no less true in other and higher realms. The Renaissance was the emancipation of the mind from intellectual despotisms, and the birth of thought into the realm of freedom. Art and philosophy and scientific inquiry—a long way off, as yet, from a perfect liberty—yet broke the shackles of tradition, and asserted the right and the privilege of free inquiry. In other words, the individual parted company

with the conventional, and began to think and see for himself.

And what was true of the Renaissance was true, almost word for word, of the Reformation. Here, however, the forces that awaked out of death-like sleep were not so much intellectual as spiritual. Luther, vainly climbing the steps of the *Scala Sancta* in Rome, while all the time the words rang in his ears, "*The just shall live by faith,*" was at once the image and the prophecy of that great awaking of spiritual forces which in Germany, in Switzerland, in Holland, in France, and in England, wrought and roused and inflamed the souls of men with a fire from on high. But, various as these movements were in various lands, as indeed was true of that other which we have known as the Renaissance, behind them all, as John Addington Symonds has said, was "the endeavor of man to reconstitute himself as a free being, not as the thrall of theological despotism"; an endeavor which "restored the confidence in their own faculties to men striving after spiritual freedom; revealed the continuity of history and the identity of human nature in spite of diverse creeds and different customs, . . . pro-

voked inquiry, encouraged criticism, shattered the mental barriers imposed by mediæval orthodoxy "*—in a word, proclaimed the new birth of the individual.

And that, indeed, was the highest meaning of those two great movements which the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries include. Of profound and prophetic significance, just here, was that great social uprising in connection with one of them—the Reformation in Germany—which is ordinarily known as the Peasants' War. This was a coalition of the peasants against the rapacity and cruelty of the feudal aristocracy, a cruelty and rapacity which, in its brutal disregard of the personal rights of the workingman, was no inadequate image of that theory of a social order which virtually denied to the peasant and the serf any rights as an individual whatever. The leaders of the revolutionary movement which revolted against such a condition of things set forth their aims in a paper of remarkable temperance and self-restraint, in which they said that they did not wish for war, and asked for nothing that was not in accord-

* J. A. Symonds: Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. xx., p. 385.

ance with the Gospel—that, for instance, serfdom should be abolished; that compulsory service should be abolished, and that wages should be paid for work; that peasant service should be regulated by contract, not by the master's whim; and that work done above contract should be separately reckoned and paid for; that rents should be equitable, not capricious; and that arbitrary punishments should be abolished. If, now, you will go below the letter of these demands, made as they were so long ago as January, 1525, you will see that that which, as a fundamental principle, underlies them all, is a clear conception of man as an individual, not as an item in a herd; not as a fraction in an impersonal aggregate; not as a chattel or a tool, but a single, separate, solitary soul, to think, to choose, to be recognized, and to be reckoned with. And when once that conception of manhood was born into a human society, the new era had begun!

I may not follow that new era in its larger and higher progress, which would take us far afield from the topic of these lectures; but the pertinency of that progress to the situation of to-day is a thing which imperatively demands

our intelligent recognition. The student of history will find in the Introduction (IV.) to Hegel's "Philosophy of History" some most pertinent light at this point. "The spirit of Christianity"—"itself," as Mackenzie has said, "one of the strongest antagonists of authority"—"had been buried under a mass of more or less alien forms until its meaning was almost entirely obscured"; and so, not unnaturally, "the Teutonic nations in particular, characterized as they have always been by a strong love of independence, especially in matters of thought and religious life, revolted against formalities that had lost their meaning; and, aided by the enlightenment which the diffusion of the new learning (of the Renaissance) had begun to secure, claimed for themselves the right of private judgment" in religion, "first, and then in secular affairs." The sticks were dry; particular abuses set flame to them; and the Reformation was the result.

"All this is familiar enough to us. But what is important to notice is that it was simply a single step in a general movement. The next step—one, indeed, which began almost simultaneously with the Reformation, if not a little

before it—was to secure political rights for the whole body of the people; to abolish the prerogative of class, and make the absolute rule of any individual, or collection of individuals, impossible."*

And there you have, in a very real sense, the statement of the whole case. It was the individual absolutist at the top against the individual serf at the bottom; and the whole history of those great social and political movements which have shaken ancient societies to their centre and overturned thrones, and shattered despotisms and reconstructed political constitutions, turns upon this single thing. Man, at last, realized himself; he was, he might be, he was made to be, under God and a just law, his own master. For his thoughts, his beliefs, his conduct, he was responsible first of all to himself; and it was for him, and not another, to choose his home, his tasks, his destiny.

Yes, I hear someone say: It was, after all, a very rational and instinctive conclusion. Given a creature with capacities for choosing and judging, and howsoever long you may coerce

* Introduction to Social Philosophy, J. S. Mackenzie, pp. 74, 75.

or enthrall them, they will sooner or later assert themselves. But the fact remains, says the objector, that, after all, this ideal independence of the individual is impossible. To make it perfect you would have to dismiss him, like Robinson Crusoe, to a desert island, and, when he had found himself there, life, as with Robinson Crusoe, would have been but a tame and dreary affair until he had found his man Friday. And the objector is quite right. That is to say, in other words, the independence of the individual could only hope to find what, with many minds, could be its ideal realization when the individual had ceased to be a member of human society—which is only another way of saying that it would be practically unendurable. For, to carry the matter of personal freedom, the realization and exercise of an individual life, to its fullest practicable point, let us imagine someone who finds the conditions of ordinary society intolerable, and determines to withdraw from them. Accompanied by his single household, his wife and children and servants, all alike absolutely subject to his will, he retires to some island in the sea, there to realize his dream of individual liberty. But

no sooner has such a one arrived in this island home of a perfect liberty than he finds that, in a very real and stern sense, he is no more really free than before. He is, first of all, this absolute monarch and master, the slave of his own wants, for he must work to supply them. And then, as a husband and father, he is equally the slave of others' wants. He is a man and not a brute, with a man's heart to move him, and a man's conscience to plague him; and therefore he cannot ignore them. And thus he finds, after all, that freedom, the realization of the individual life, is only a relative and never an absolute thing, and that he cannot live without, or apart from, his kind if he would.

It is well to hold this fact in mind as we advance in the history of the individual from mediæval times to our own. Nothing is more impressive than that history as an illustration of the progress of the race out of the bondage of caste and class and absolutism of rule unless it be the coincident history of its limitations. For, as we follow the progress of the one, we are perpetually confronted with the disclosure of the other. Step by step the peasant and the serf, in Europe and Great Britain, advanced

from his enslaved and servile condition to the place and the rights of a free man. He won the right to own land, and to till it for himself; he achieved liberty to arise, to depart, to enter in, under the common law, at his own discretion; he won the mighty weapon of the ballot, and yet he was not free. For, as superseding the earlier ages—military, agricultural, commercial, whatever they were—there dawned on the world the industrial age, there entered with it into the constitution of human society certain absolutely new factors. With the invention of machinery, there came what we call " plants " of machinery, and with plants of machinery there came, *e.g.*, the modern factory town. It may not at first be obvious how it was that these invaded the freedom of the individual, but a little consideration will make it plain. Previous to the dawn of the industrial era with its huge aggregations of factories, furnaces, and mills of whatever sort, there had, indeed, been communities larger or smaller of work-people, but they had been constituted under wholly different conditions. They were communities of independent workmen who could perform their task, which was itself usually an independent task,

by which I mean a task which wrought not upon a fragment but upon a whole, independently of other workmen. But, in the case of the modern workman, the difficulty is not merely that his task usually is fragmentary in its nature—that is to say, a labor upon some single portion, quite useless in itself, of a larger and more complicated mechanism—but that in the doing of this task he becomes, sooner or later, practically incompetent to perform any other. And the bearing of this upon the man himself becomes presently very plain. His task irks or overtaxes, or mentally as well as physically impoverishes him, and you tell him to turn his hand to something else. You might as well tell him to buy a yacht and spend a year in the Mediterranean! He has lost the power to adapt himself to some other task, even if—as is, however, very infrequently the case—there is any other task within his reach. He is in a community and among huge plants all alike devoted, as the case may be, to cotton, or woollen, or iron industry, and to nothing else. He can, perhaps, go out of one factory of a particular kind into another factory of a similar kind, and, so far as any change in the conditions of his work is

concerned, that is all. He wears no collar, and he is branded with no owner's name, but the owner of the factory practically owns him, all the same. And thus personality in such a one, the individual life and work, and, ultimately, character, are merged at last in some vast aggregation, of which and in which he is a mere atom.

It is, as we look back upon it to-day, the tragic element in our industrial progress that it has been on the whole so largely indifferent to this result. The mighty energies of commerce, and still more of manufactures, have pressed forward on their triumphant way with small thought of what befell the individual. If the conditions of his task were speedily fatal, if not to health and strength and life, then to courage and hope and happiness, that of course was to be regretted; but such results were a part of the wear and tear of the great strife for markets, and as such we must accept them. And so, as Mackenzie has finely said,* "The growth of material interests has not only had the effect of leading us into material difficulties, it has also obscured those other interests which are of a

* Introduction to Social Philosophy, p. 118.

more ethereal texture, whose loss robs life of some of its chief contents. The Commercial Spirit," he adds, "has eclipsed the gayety of nations."

If only it had eclipsed no more! But the appalling fact, in our modern industrial conditions, is that they have so often conspired to destroy manhood, to efface the individual, and to reduce existence to a dull and heartless struggle for a bald livelihood.

At such a point I maintain that there arises for the subjects of the Kingdom of God in the world the plain obligation to ask themselves some very searching questions: Are these conditions of our modern industrial life inevitable and unavoidable? Are the remedies for them which have, thus far, been suggested, competent to the emergency? And if they are not, are there any others which it may be worth while for a Christian civilization to recognize and employ? Let us look briefly at these three questions in their order, and consider the answers which may be made to them.

I. And, first, are those conditions of our modern industrial life, which have so largely impaired the freedom or effaced the personality

of the individual, irremediable? There are those who do not hesitate to say that they are. When you suggest to them those various modes for bettering the condition of the working-man, and freeing him from the imprisonment of his narrow task-work, they answer you that those modes of betterment can only be employed at the cost, substantially, of profit to the manufacturer. The vulgar phrase which declares that such a one "is not in business for his health," but in order to make money, they declare to be, if you please, a coarse but, all the same, an essentially true statement of the whole situation. They urge, in other words, that the inexorable laws of competition compel the manufacturer to crowd his workmen close up to the utmost limit, to pay to him not the maximum, but the minimum wage that the situation will allow; and, instead of employing any part of his profits in bettering the homes, enlarging the horizon, lightening the scant leisure of his work-people, to turn those profits back into the business itself for the purpose of enlarging and improving the plant, repairing the machinery, or advertising his wares. Such employers do not always affect to be indifferent to the condi-

tion of the working-man; they simply proclaim themselves impotent, so long as they are in the midst of the fierce strife for a market, to improve it.

I shall not attempt to maintain that there is no force in such reasoning as this, though it ought not to be hard, from a merely material stand-point, to discern its essential fallacy. That fallacy lies in the essential blunder of ignoring consequences which, under the conditions of our modern civilization, are inevitable. One of those conditions, and one of the most potent, is the spread of popular education. Whatever our times have not done for working-men, it must be owned that they have greatly widened the range of the free training of the mind. The public-school system of the United States is undoubtedly one of its chief glories, and that of other countries occupying a foremost place in the industrial life of the world is not far behind it. But it is an inevitable, though as yet imperfectly recognized consequence of this, that working-men, artisans, mechanics, factory-hands, and the rest, read far more than did these classes a century ago—and *think*. Not only is this the case, but it is also true that the

quality of their reading is, often, much above what we should suppose. On visiting a College Settlement in a great city, not long ago, I was shown the library, and was, I confess, surprised at its range and variety. Standing over against the department devoted to fiction, I said to the librarian, "The heaviest demands, I suppose, are upon these shelves?" "Oh, no!" was the answer. "What is mainly your constituency?" I asked. "Boys and young men," said the librarian; "and what is oftenest asked for is history and biography."

But it ought to be obvious that when history and biography are one's mental nourishment, that mental process is not far away in which the reader begins to compare and infer. It will be impossible, *e.g.*, for a working-man to read history and not discover the significant changes which were brought about in the Middle Ages by the great Trade Guilds or Fraternities. It will be equally impossible for him to read the history of the ages that followed those which we call mediæval without seeing that, out from them, in time there arose that spirit of free inquiry and of the combined action of the individually weak which, in our modern times, has

revolutionized the world. The step from this to the modern trades-union is a very short one, and no one who has followed the stream of human action from the sixteenth century to this hour can be surprised that it was taken.

It was, on the whole, a wise and timely step; and the essence of it, I venture to affirm, lies embedded in the eternal equities. In saying so, I am not at all unmindful of the mischiefs that, in some cases, it has wrought, of the iniquities of which it has been the parent; nor the often unwisdom with which its worst forces—which are brute forces—have been invoked. It is natural enough that, when the great majority of people take note of these, in connection with some widely organized strike, and read of the violence of the striker and the brutal injuries done to unoffending men whose only crime is a desire to earn their own bread by honest labor, they should cry out against organizations which mainly exist, so far as they can see, to defy the law, and to commit some wanton breach of the public peace. But such persons should remember that, in some cases at any rate, of labor strikes, it has been as it was in the days that preceded the French Revolution. Then there

was, on the one hand, an agricultural and oligarchical system which squeezed from the laborer or taxed out of the artisan the last drop of blood, and too often wasted the substance of the nation in riotous living—this, and a stony indifference, a hard insistence upon vested rights, and an often mockery of the miseries of the poor. And the deepest shame and ignominy of it all was that, in such a condition of things, the Church and the State were by their impotent acquiescence often as guilty as the nobles.

Now I do not say, I beg you to observe, that the analogy of our modern situation holds to this at every point. But there is enough of resemblance in the comparison, at any rate, to explain the existence of trades-unions. They are the fruit of a situation in which, apparently, the individual workman had largely ceased to be considered. Labor had come to be reckoned mainly as a commodity, and as no more. The individuality of the laborer was a mere accident in the commercial problem, with which the employer was called upon to concern himself only so far as concerned the effective and productive working of

the machinery, and no more. That labor meant *men;* and that laborers were a group of individual men not only with carcasses, hands and feet, and the rest, to be harnessed to a machine, but also with minds and emotions and imaginings, and even higher aspirations—can you not see the smile of good-humored contempt with which the average mill-manager would greet you, or them, if approached along any such line as that?

Well, the consequences of such a situation were inevitable, and we have already seen them. The working-man, largely isolated by his circumstances from the greater human sympathies of those otherwise situated than himself, has turned to his fellows. These could understand; these could sympathize; and these, combined, could *act.*

A discussion of the principles and policy of trades-unionism does not belong here, even if the limits of this discussion permitted; but it is pertinent to those rights and aspirations of the individual, for which it is my aim here to secure intelligent recognition, that I should point out its relation to his moral and social development. "The value of the trade-union

movement," says Mr. Geoffrey Drage,* " is to be estimated not so much by the extent to which it has raised the rate of wages and reduced the hours of labor, as by its educational influence as a preparation for the responsibilities of self-government. . . . The education which voluntary associations have provided for the working-man has given a new purpose to his life. . . . 'Still more than this,' Dr. Baernreither states, 'the workman who has established and directs . . . these . . . associations . . . has ceased to be an inactive spectator of the State and of society. His life has received a new purpose and character. . . . His understanding and his insight in economic matters are increasing; he is learning by his own experience to recognize the difficulties which oppose themselves to the carrying out of social institutions; he is becoming more moderate in his claims, calmer in judgment, and more contented with success.' " †

In part these conclusions are undoubtedly true, and have in them a note of high promise

* The Labor Problem, p. 5.

† English Associations of Working Men, by Dr. Baernreither.

for the future. But it must be owned that, in some respects, they have not, especially of late, been borne out by the facts; and for this I do not think that it is difficult to account. In the trades-union the working-man has found a weapon whose achievements have doubtless more than once surprised himself. To its menace the employer has, now and then, surrendered under conditions that to labor seemed to have meagre promise of victory. Is it surprising that, with such experience to encourage him, the working-man has sometimes invoked the strike when there was little or nothing in the justice of his cause, or the circumstances of the case, to warrant his doing so? Is it any more surprising that labor, made sensible of its strength through organization, has become sometimes apparently intoxicated with the consciousness of power; and has dreamed of a social order where *all* the conditions of industrial activity shall be determined by the wage-earner? That this is substantially, in many cases, the present situation, no one who has observed it can be ignorant. Trades-unionism has, in some of its more recent movements, advanced so far as to decree that any such thing as unorganized labor, in the sense of un-union-

ized labor, shall not exist. It has inaugurated strikes for no other purpose than to compel corporations to refuse any others than unionized workmen admission to their mills and factories; and to associations of men within its own fellowship who have refused to join in strikes to this end because they had no local or personal grievance, and did not believe in the equity of demands which practically deprived themselves and others of all liberty of choice, they have decreed expulsion from their order. And all these things they have done sometimes at the cost of broken engagements, and in violation of their plighted faith.

That such a policy has produced a wide-spread distrust of the modern trades-union, there can be no smallest doubt; and this for a reason which those who compose its membership ought to be the first to see. For what is the object of the trades-union if it be not the emancipation of the workman? The earlier conditions of his tasks made of him, it was wont to be urged, a slave. He was held in the grip of a soulless employer, a corporation, a "trust," a syndicate, simply as so much brute force, to be set at work or called off from it under the influence

of considerations which were alike indifferent to his interests or his choice. His individuality was destroyed, and he was no longer a free man, but only a tool in the hands of a selfish employer. And, since the individual working-man was not strong enough singly to cope with the employer, he resorted to the entirely lawful and proper means of combination to resist him, and so to free himself from a grasp which was at once soulless and sometimes cruel, and to rise and stand erect as, in some sense at any rate, his own master. Under such circumstances, what can be said of a system which frees him only to enslave him anew and more absolutely? For, surely, an organization, membership in which is compulsory and not voluntary, is not freedom, but slavery. I may believe in the trades-union—as, individually, I do—and think it an admirable thing; but if I do not believe in it, and by any manner of coercion, physical, social, or moral, you compel me to belong to it, you are simply robbing me of my freedom and making me your bondman. It is not surprising therefore that, referring to a recent struggle with employers initiated by a very powerful trades-union for precisely this

purpose, a public journal should have said: "The average man finds it very hard to understand how any body of men could have been brought to comply with an order to strike for such cause. These men have declared themselves against freedom, and in favor of absolute tyranny. They are arrayed not merely against capital, but against their own homes, their families, the commonest and most necessary rights of the working-man, and the cause of human freedom. There could be no greater curse to themselves than to grant their demands. For in that case *the individual worker* would hereafter become the absolute serf of the leaders of organizations in whose choice he had but the voice of one man among thousands. Outside of them he must starve; within them he must obey orders no matter what they might be."*

The pertinency of such criticism to that element in the modern industrial problem with which we are dealing is not obscure. This writer recognizes, in other words, that those very organizations which were devised to secure the freedom of the individual—his right of action, choice, association, and the like—may come to

* The Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 27, 1901.

be so administered as in fact gravely to threaten it; in other words, that the working-man, in escaping out of the servitude of the capitalist, may only too late discover that he has fled from it into the more abject and bitter bondage of the trades-union. More abject and more bitter, I say, because his subordination to his employer was at least regulated, ordinarily, by a considerable and sometimes by a very high degree of intelligence; the manager or superintendent of a particular industry being almost necessarily a person of more than ordinary ability, and a person, therefore, to whom considerations of reason and equity might more or less hopefully appeal. But the modern labor leader, whatever other qualities he may have possessed, would not seem ordinarily to have been chosen for high intelligence, for wide information, or for anything approaching a judicial mind. Said a working-man recently, referring with evident pride to his particular labor leader, "Did you never hear him? He has a voice that you could hear across the river. He has a fist as big as a leg of mutton; and when, last night, he struck the table with it, he made a noise like a clap of thunder. That is the kind of man we want for

a leader!" Alas, my brother, however useful he may be in other ways, if these are the measure of his endowments, that is the kind of man no one wants as a leader!

II., III. What is it now, to answer briefly the second and third questions I have asked, that in such a situation *is* wanted? Three things, as I think you will agree with me; and these are Intelligence, Patience, and Brotherliness. And these, I beg at once to say, are equally wanted on both sides; on the part of the individual working-man, and equally, nay as to some of them, still more on the part of all others.

1. And first, intelligence. The mental situation of the working-man, or of those who have hitherto most frequently been his nearest teachers, has substantially been that of a man who knew only the teaching, *e.g.*, of Proudhon, Karl Marx, and Henry George. The basis of Proudhon's social philosophy was, as you will remember, that "Property is robbery"; and this is, naturally, a very agreeable doctrine to one who has not got any. Mr. Karl Marx maintained that the whole product of labor belonged to the laborer; and Mr. Henry George, that the whole land belonged to anybody or

nobody in particular, as one should prefer to state it. The essential fallacy of any and all of these positions has been abundantly shown to any intelligent mind that cares to examine the question, and I would commend to your attention in this connection Mr. J. S. Mackenzie's "Introduction to Social Philosophy,"* Mr. Kaufmann's "Socialism and Modern Thought,"† William Graham's "Socialism New and Old,"‡ W. H. Mallock's "Labour and the Popular Welfare,"§ and Henry Wood's "The Political Economy of Humanism,"‖ as not necessarily the most profound and exhaustive treatises on the questions with which they deal, but as, on the whole, lucid, temperate, and informing discussions of subjects widely misunderstood and even more widely misstated. There is often, it may be remarked in this connection, a curious misapprehension as to the persistent prejudices, and what I may call the deliberate mental opacity of working-men as to

* James Macklehose & Sons, Glasgow.
† Methuen & Co., London.
‡ D. Appleton & Co., New York.
§ A. & G. Black, London.
‖ Lee & Shepard, Boston.

industrial and sociological questions; but I am bound to say that, in an experience based upon a somewhat more than usually intimate acquaintance with them covering substantially my whole ministry, I have not found the warrant for any such conclusion. If the personal reference will be pardoned, it may perhaps be permitted to me to say that (with the exception of its diaconate spent in what was then the Diocese of Pennsylvania) that ministry began in a large manufacturing town in a seaboard State, and was from its outset concerned, among others, with iron-founders, moulders, wrought-iron workers, and the like. Neither among these, in a pastoral relation extending over a good part of a decade, nor subsequently in the greater manufacturing centres of Boston and New York, where, especially in the latter city, it has been my fortune to be associated with others upon a Board of Mediation and Conciliation between working-men and their employers; and where, repeatedly, I was called upon to act as arbitrator or umpire by unions of mechanics or other working-men, can I truthfully say that I found any reluctance to listen to an argument, to weigh evidence, to see a question in the

lights that come from both sides, nor to be influenced by them. Indeed, if I were forced to say, so far as my own experience was concerned, on which side the balance of such qualities lay, it would be on the side of the working-men.

And this suggests the obvious inference that, if intelligence is demanded in this connection from the working-man, it is still more demanded from the capitalist, the employer, the legislator, and, most of all I am tempted to say, from ministers of religion and all those whose position and culture and beliefs demand that they should form their opinions of any question in the light of the eternal truth. In this connection our common ignorance is at once amazing and deplorable. Our systems of education, our popular literature, our sense of personal responsibility, are all strangely incompetent to the grave questions which in this connection to-day confront us. That they touch the foundations of morals; that they involve the gravest issues, whether as concerning individual rights or social order; that they are questions which, in other forms, but involving essentially the same problems, have shaken kingdoms, as in the case of

France, to their ruin; and, most of all, that they cover ground which Jesus Christ proclaimed as that on which alone the Kingdom of God can stand—to all this the great majority of us are curiously and tragically indifferent.

2. And that leads me to a second requirement of such a situation as this, and that is patience. It is demanded first of all of the working-man, in the interests of ideals which to him are most of all precious, and of which, by him, the realization is most of all desired. The industrial era, he says—and we must own that too often and too largely he is right—has robbed him of his individuality. It has made him a cog in a wheel, a spoke in a hub, a mere storehouse of brute power or of manual aptitude in a mill or a factory. But, alas! the conditions which prepared the way for such a situation were a long time in maturing, and must inevitably take a good while for their reformation. The problem of labor, machinery, and the laborer, in connection with the emancipation and elevation of the latter, is hedged about by difficulties so complex and issues many of them so obscure that anybody who has fallen in love with some union-approved, walking-dele-

gate-patterned, express-train-moving remedy for them, is destined to bitter disappointment. It is as in disentangling a skein of silk. You may break the fine threads, and straighten out the whole involved mass in a moment or two; but, if you would save the delicate filaments from fracture and conserve them to be woven into some fine and beautiful fabric in the future, you must disentangle them with infinite patience, and with scrupulous nicety and discrimination.

And all this, as it is true of the whole matter on the side of the working-man, is even more true on yours and mine. It is one of the most depressing features of our industrial situation to see how exaggerated, in the minds of educated people, is the value of legislation in connection with labor troubles, and how eager and instant is the impulse to invoke it. It has, undoubtedly, its place and value, as, on another occasion and in a different connection, I shall undertake to show. But it is not the way out of our present perplexities, and it will undoubtedly disappoint him who thinks so.

3. There is, however, another and a better way, and that is the way of our Master, Jesus Christ, or, as I have already described it, the

way of brotherliness. The supreme mischief of our modern industrial system has been that it has widened and deepened the chasm between master and man. As some of you will doubtless recall, Roman Catholic writers on social questions have attempted with a characteristic adroitness, not greatly tempered with any nice scruple as to either their facts or their inferences, to trace the destruction of the social bonds between different classes to the individualizing tendencies of Protestantism, and, recalling the trades-guilds and other social and industrial institutions of mediæval times, to insist that these were destroyed by the Reformation and its child, the Revolution. But the obvious answer to such statements is that, in countries where the Reformation has never won the slightest, or if any, only the slightest, foothold, as in Spain, the condition of the working-classes today is one of extremest degradation and misery. I recall at this moment a visit to a vast cigar factory in the city of Seville, which I made some years ago, and in which I found a thousand working-girls herded together under conditions which, even now, it is loathsome to recall. No; the fault here has not been in any one religious

system more than another, but rather in that overwhelming wave of commercialism which today more and more threatens to swallow up the individual, or else to reduce him to a wholly impersonal atom.

There is but one influence that can resist that tendency; and it must be sought and found, I repeat, in the life and work of Jesus Christ. He lived among the poor. None of us, save under the compulsion of a similar poverty, do that! Our modern parochialism, with its passion for a bourgeois respectability, too often removes the clergy largely, and the great body of others who are not working people wholly, from any contact with them. We do not know them; we cannot understand them, and—let us stop indulging in the hypocrisy that pretends otherwise—we do not sympathize with them. Their modes of life, their modes of thought, their manners and habits and speech, are all alien to us; and, if we are ordinarily honest with ourselves, we must confess that if we could, we would gladly dismiss them from our consideration altogether.

Ah, my brother who art so minded, go back once more and sit at the feet of your Master!

One thing about His earthly ministry is absolutely certain. It was never lacking in a profound and tender human interest; and a supreme reason for that, I am persuaded, was that "He knew what was in Man." Do you? Have you ever tried to find out? Have you ever drawn near enough, and tarried long enough, to give you a chance to discover? Well, there are those who, in our day and generation, and in the face of this sore perplexity of social alienation, have set about doing so, and have persisted in it; and this is the surprising thing that they will tell you that, of all other undertakings to which they have addressed themselves, it is the most *profoundly interesting!* A young college-bred man who had just graduated with high honors came to us one summer in New York, and asked for an opportunity to see something of our Community work, and spend several weeks among working men and boys, and in the homes and households that sheltered them; and this, when he had concluded his period of service, was his reiterated and eager testimony: "There is no experience like it! If only you can get near them, it is a liberal education just to know them and hear them talk! Their

ideas are often crude, their logic disjointed; their prejudices intense and bitter, but they have in them the soul of candor, and of chivalry, too, if only one can touch it!"

"The soul of chivalry, if only one can touch it!" It is the answer to the whole problem. There is in each man a solitary soul. That, first of all, we must recognize. Against any social system that ignores or disregards another's personality, we must protest and revolt with unyielding tenacity; and then we must, each one of us for himself, search out some such soul and see if we cannot touch it. There are already at work among us many admirable mechanisms for bettering the condition of the working-man; we must breathe into them the breath of a personal life and service. To the full we have tested all that social machinery can do—free reading-rooms, ball-grounds, billiards and bowling-alleys, and all the rest—but, as a young man who came to a great city not long ago exclaimed, "What are they all worth? I belong to a church of three thousand members, and, since the day I entered it, no man has put out his hand to me!" Christ put out his hand to men, and touched them. In reforming so-

ciety he began with the individual, called him, addressed him, cleansed him, singly, separately, solitarily, first of all, and so built up a Divine Society upon Earth—and so must we. There is no other way.

MAN: MEN: AND THEIR MASTER

NO. II

THE CORPORATION

NO. II

THE CORPORATION

THE law of association is as old as human society; indeed, in its higher forms, it may be said to mark the ascent of that society from its more primitive and barbaric forms. First of all, as I have already pointed out, we have the ascent from the patriarchal to the tribal organization of society, and then, in turn, from the latter to the dynastic and imperial forms. And out of these, in time, there come, by an inevitable law of evolution, those minor forms of organization—military, social, ecclesiastical, commercial—through which we ascend step by step to those extremely complex and all but all-encompassing mechanisms of corporate activity which we know to-day as industrial.

It is, in my judgment, impossible for the citizen who is a Christian student to ignore these, even if he should desire to do so. A corporation

has been defined by someone as a " piece of machinery " ; and the maxim of Sir Edward Coke —" Corporations cannot commit treason, nor be outlawed, nor excommunicate, for they have no souls "—is one which, detached from its immediate connection, is widely employed to remind us that the acts of corporations are to be accepted as, in a sense, outside the arena, as of human sentiments, so of human responsibilities. Indeed, in this connection it is one of the humiliating notes of modern history that, while the law by no means excepts a corporation from a corporate responsibility, the history of corporations has not, ordinarily, revealed them as recognizing such responsibility until the penalties of the law have been rigorously invoked to compel such recognition.

It would be interesting if, in this connection, there were space for it, to inquire how far this characteristic of corporations, which is observable even in their earliest history, arose from the circumstances of their origin. The organized life of earlier peoples, Egyptian, Persian, and the rest, can hardly be said to have had anything answering to our modern corporations. They were, as a rule, imperial despotisms, in which

corporate activities were represented only or mainly by the army. But with the progress of Roman arts, arms, and letters, toward a world-wide ascendency, there came into being, under an increasing necessity, those associations of individuals known as *Collegia*, which originally consisted of at least three persons who were said to be *corporati—habere corpus.* "They could hold property in common, and [mark the distinctive feature which in modern times has grown to such colossal proportions] had a common chest. They might sue and be sued by (or through) their agent (*syndicus* or *actor*). There was a complete separation in law between the rights of a *collegium* as a body and those of its individual members. The *collegium* remained in existence, although all its original members were changed; and it was governed by its own by-laws, provided those were not contrary to the common law."* Naturally enough, the earliest of these Roman corporations were *civitates*, or municipalities; and after them came *collegia* of priests, and Vestal Virgins, and the various trade associations; *fabri, naviculariі,*

* Robertson, Professor of Roman Law, University of London.

etc., which represented interests such as those which are most conspicuous in the corporate life of our own day. With the dawn of the Christian era these corporations underwent the transformations in aim and purpose which were inevitable from those changes which followed in its train; but a fact of principal significance is that, instead of disappearing with other mechanisms which were distinctive of a pagan society, they seem, on the contrary, to have attracted the attention, and secured the sanction and approval of the Church. For, when one comes to study the history of the Religious Orders, he soon discovers that their monastic features, in the strict construction of that term, were by no means, if not at first, then ultimately, their most conspicuous features. The theory upon which they came into being, *viz.*, that they were to be a refuge from worldly cares and business, vanished before a great while as, step by step, they grew in numbers and powers; and those of us who are under the impression which some Churchmen in our mother country have striven with great earnestness to produce, that the suppression of monasteries by Henry VIIIth, and the confiscation of the property of Religious

Orders, were instances of a wanton and arbitrary abuse of kingly power which grossly wronged bodies of devout and godly men, have only to push their studies of the history of monasticism a little farther back in order to learn that the secularization of these religious corporations, and their large devotion to worldly ends by not very scrupulous means, were notes of their history at least five hundred years earlier, as the testimony of their own highest authorities and the Bulls of Popes and decrees of councils abundantly testify. The matter is of interest here, and pertinent to this discussion, because it discovers for our admonition an inevitable tendency in the principle of the corporation with which those who are, or are to be, Christian teachers are directly and gravely concerned. There can be no question that the evil in religious corporations arose, as the evils in all other corporations have arisen, from the existence of occult and irresponsible powers. The monastic life involved seclusion. Its dominant note was not merely, as is commonly understood, that its members could not come out into the world, but even more—that the world could not come into, nor see into, its precincts, its rules, its occupa-

tions, its life. It drew together and bound together, in a common interest and purpose, a body of men or women, all of whom were not clever, or acute, or aggressive; most of whom, indeed, were none of these things, and who, therefore, furnished ordinarily the most efficient tools for those who were. And then there followed what is always apt to follow where there is a situation which has in it the elements of secrecy, opportunity, and a co-operating constituency. In a religious order, obviously sordid or dubious methods or aims were skilfully draped as means to a glorious end; even as in a modern corporation, doubtful or equivocal features are excused for the sake of splendid successes. And so these ancient or mediæval corporations grew and spread until their very existence became a menace to the communities that tolerated them, and a stain upon the Church that fostered them. The historian of the future may wisely disinter their story for the sidelights that they will cast upon the powers and perils of the modern corporation.

That story would not be complete, however, if it ignored those other corporations, not ecclesiastical but secular, of which the Middle

Ages were also the parents; and which were, in their turn, the forerunners of another form of corporation even more precisely industrial in its character than any other; I mean the Guilds. In one sense it would be inaccurate to describe these as the children of the Middle Ages, for, in fact, there are traces of them in Greece two or three centuries before Christ, designated sometimes as *Ερανου* (clubs), or, again, as *θίασου* (companies), and to be found at Rhodes, in the islands of the Archipelago, at the Piræus, and elsewhere. These guilds or associations seem, in many of their characteristics, to have anticipated the trade or artisan societies of the tenth and following centuries of the Christian era, and to have found their origin in much the same aims. In a word, the position of the workman, two thousand years ago and more, was not, in most respects, greatly different from what it is to-day. Single-handed he was no match for his employer. The latter could dismiss him at his will, and hire another in his place. He could engage him at one wage, and next week reduce him to another. He could hire him to work twelve hours a day, and constrain him, when once his task was begun, to

continue it for fifteen or twenty. Why? Because, if the workman were dissatisfied, his employer could not only discharge him on the instant and hire someone else, but could do so indefinitely; and, so long as this situation continued, labor was virtually under the employer's heel. I state the case in these bald terms because I want, if I may, to get you to realize the situation to which the modern trades-union was the alternative. The ancient society of this class had this one great advantage over the modern trades-union that the master workman or mechanic, who was himself often the employer of apprentices and inferior craftsmen, was himself a member of the guild. The social divisions which then separated classes were largely different from our own; and that system which arrayed them as nobles, gentry, and commoners, grouped all handicraftsmen, whether of high or low degree, together. We think that we have gained a great deal in abolishing all these distinctions in our own day, but the question as to what we have lost in doing so never seems to have occurred to us. One thing, at any rate, we have lost, which in some aspects of it was more precious than all the rest, and that

is *contacts*. If anybody to-day cares to tell the truth about the matter of social distinctions in the United States of America—which most of us unfortunately don't—he will be compelled to own that, from top to bottom, all over the land, amid whatever community or neighborhood or village, the effort that is most strenuous and most persistent is, not to draw near to our fellow-men, but to draw away from them; to remind other people by our pretensions, our reserves, our condescensions mixed with contempt, that we are not as other men are, and least of all as they. Now, the enormous advantage of the trade and artisan guilds of mediæval times was that they antagonized this tendency, and drew men together—the master and the craftsman, the artisan and the laborer, the artist and the drudge. It is impossible to read the history of the greater guilds, whether in Germany, France, Holland, or England, without discovering how fine a spirit of *esprit de corps* they kindled, and how great a stimulus they gave both to fine workmanship and to brotherly fidelity in the doing of it.

In the two aims or motives which I have thus indicated, we have, it would appear, an unan-

swerable argument for the existence of the trade-guilds; and, if so, for the trades-unions. They were the defence of the weak workman, and the inspiration of the less capable one. He had, if he were weak, his order behind him; he had, if he were but poorly competent, the ennobling example of his order before him. There can be no question, I think, that the guild of other ages gave the world better work and better men to do it, and the men themselves a better wage and a juster master. There can be as little question, I am persuaded, that the guild of to-day, which is the trades-union, can be made a no less efficient agency, not for the good of a class only, but for the good of the whole.

That, as yet, it has so often and so largely failed of any such results is owing to considerations which, as yet imperfectly recognized, will, when they are perceived and accepted, vastly improve, if they do not wholly transform, the whole situation. The trades-unions, *e.g.*, have, as a rule, maintained toward employers an attitude of armed neutrality. The most generous efforts on the part of manufacturers and others to manifest in their dealings with their workmen a considerate and liberal spirit have

often been met with a temper of suspicion and distrust which would be grotesque if it were not so pathetic. An illustration of what I mean has recently been afforded in connection with an inquiry conducted by the Board of Trade in England as to the matter of profit-sharing by workmen. As students of economics will remember, experiments more or less successful in this direction have been made in France, of which that by M. Leclaire, the house-painter of Paris, is much the most noteworthy; in Belgium, England, and by Mr. Nelson in this country, near St. Louis. I shall not attempt to discuss the value of these experiments in this connection, to which they are only remotely germane; but I would ask your attention to the answers of several trades-unions to questions as to the value of profit-sharing as a feature of the relations of employers and work-people; the principle of profit-sharing being simply that every working-man should have, in addition to his covenanted wage, a certain share of, or percentage upon, the profits of the business—the idea being, of course, to give the workman a more direct interest in his employers' particular enterprise, and a stimulus to diligence and fidel-

ity in his own part of it. Now it would not seem that in such a proposition there was anything hostile or derogatory to the working-man, but only something which would appeal to his sympathy and appreciation, if not to his ambition. Listen now to the reception which, from certain trades-unions, the proposition received:

One trades-union replies: "Conditions of scheme antagonistic to freedom of men, contrary to custom of trade, and opposed to trade-union principle."

Again: "The union has never made any formal objection, but has always regarded the scheme as an excuse for getting the men to work at high pressure, and turn out more work than under ordinary circumstances."

Again: "Has a tendency to rob a man of his manly independence, and to remove the scope and field of trade-unions."

Again: "Because all do not share, and the employees know not what the profits are for the year. The employer, the men said, has speculated and made heavy losses."

Again, a fresh ground for objection is suggested: "Because a different system of working has been introduced whereby two men have to

turn out an amount of work equal to that which took three men to do." "Because of a certain amount of suspicion that the desire of employers who introduce the system (of profit-sharing) is to weaken the influence of trade organizations upon the men; and because it is believed that the fact of a bonus being given induces the men to hide, or fail to take action against, breaches of trade-union regulations."*

Now I have no slightest intention of discussing the force or value of these objections on the part of working-men to a system of profit-sharing; but simply to call your attention to the *animus* which inspires them, of which (unless I have been misinformed) we have had illustrations nearer home. At the first view it is profoundly discouraging; and no less profoundly mysterious that a proposition on the whole so manly and generous as that of profit-sharing by the employer with his workmen should be met with such pronounced distrust and suspicion. Of course, it is to be taken for granted that the master sees beforehand the probabilities, in the stimulus thus offered them, of increased advantage to himself as well as to his

* See Board of Trade Report, 1894, pp. 182–187.

workmen; but equally, of course, it ought to be recognized that, as to this, there is no certainty; while, as to the essential principle, there is an element of absolute equity which deserves to be both recognized and honored. And yet, in spite of these considerations, a proposition to certain trades-unions in the direction of profit-sharing is met by criticisms which just stop short of calling it a trick, and the purpose behind it a carefully devised scheme for inveigling more work out of the already over-tasked laborer!

Now, as I have said, the particular facts here, in any particular case, are of very secondary consequence. But what is of consequence (to you and me as disciples of Jesus Christ), in a world in which to-day the industrial classes include a vast multitude, if not in Christian lands, a vast majority of our fellow-men, is the answer to the question, "What has produced such an attitude of mind, and what has made it so widely chronic?" For, to carry the whole matter to its foundation facts, the disclosure of such a temper reveals the *animus* not of a community of civilized men bound together by a common impulse in the peaceful avocations of a well-ordered and law-abiding land; it means *war*.

"*Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes*," describes precisely that attitude of the modern working-man to the majority, thus far, of the amicable propositions which have been made to him by incorporated capital and its management.

And there are for this, I believe, two reasons. One of these, on behalf of the working-man, I desire unreservedly to recognize. He has been poorly advised; and ordinarily worse led. The labor agitator is, too often, a flamboyant orator of loud voice, reckless invective, largely inaccurate speech, inconsequent and tremendous gifts of denunciation. When hearing him shout and stamp and anathematize on platforms, calling for the power to crush the tyrant corporation or capitalist, I have been reminded of a colored preacher of whom my Right Reverend brother of Tennessee relates this incident: On one occasion he was leading the meeting in prayer, which consisted mainly in his shouting over and over again, "O Lord, give us mo' *powah*—more *powah*—more *powah*, Lord!" until a colored brother beside him, exasperated beyond endurance, at length interjected, "O g'long, brudder! Youse got powah enough. Better ask de Lawd to give yer some mo' idees!"

Yes, moderately instructed brains, the capacity in men who seek to lead others to recognize facts and their relations—these are what labor, or any other cause like it, needs, and needs in this connection most of all.

But when I have said this, and I have tried to say it with absolute candor, it is not the whole case; and, so far as the distrust on the part of working-men and of trades-unions toward corporations is concerned, it is a very inferior element in the final fact. Labor, whether individual or organized, is often unreasonable, often misinformed, often wayward; but human nature is substantially the same, pagan or Christian, in Patagonia or in Connecticut; and this, concerning it, is a bald and naked fact which, if any mill-manager or any other representative of a corporation undertakes to contradict, there is only one answer to make to him, and that is, that he is an ignoramus or a falsifier; and that fair dealing provokes fair dealing, and sharp practice equally invites sharp practice. Read the travellers' tales about the African negro from Zanzibar to the great Nyanza, and a greater scoundrel, thief, liar, traitor, brute-beast, does not walk the earth;

and then read the life of David Livingstone, and follow the dusky band who, with a tenderness and reverence that no funeral procession that ever trod the earth excelled, carried his dead body all the way from that spot in the heart of the Dark Continent where he breathed out his life to the ship that bore those sacred ashes to their final resting-place in Westminster Abbey; and then take care how you generalize about men, or races, or classes, on the basis of insufficient facts! For with men, whether in a wilderness or in a mill, it is, after all, as it is with women in a kitchen. There are heads of households, whom we all know, who never keep a servant a week, whose every domestic is "a thief," "an idler," or "an incompetent"; people whose homes are the perpetual scenes of discussions and dismissals, and whose testimony, if it were given in a court of justice under oath, would be that there had never been an honest or faithful domestic in their houses; and yet, next door to just such people, there are households wherein reign peace, and order, and mutual consideration; and where the service that is rendered earns not only its wages, but respect and gratitude—and deserves them both.

The subject brings us to one consideration in the relation of corporations to their workmen which is practically wholly unrecognized. The ordinary discussions as to the relations of the laborer and the corporation which employs him concerns itself wholly with these two parties. But a recent writer in the *Economic Review*, Mr. W. H. Lever,* has brought out with singular acumen the intermediate term in the whole problem without which the others are all but meaningless. "In order," he says, "to study fairly and accurately this question" (he is speaking at the moment of profit-sharing), "we will commence with a consideration of that hackneyed expression, 'Capital and Labor.' Never have two words been less understood. To make them understood, and connect them together, you must add the word 'management,' and make the phrase read, 'Capital, management, labor.' What are the facts? We have all known many instances where labor starting without capital has prospered, and where capital without labor has prospered. But in all such cases there has been good management. We know of instances, innumerable as the sands

* Economic Review, January 15, 1901. (Vol. xi., No. 1.)

on the sea-shore, where capital and labor have joined together without good management, but the result has always been failure. Capital and labor both are dependent on management. . . . The expression, therefore, ' Capital and labor,' standing alone, is misleading, and creates an entirely false impression. Those of us who have," adds this writer, " socialistic tendencies, and desire that the conditions of labor should be improved, believing that the improvement of the condition of labor is the only safe and certain means for the improvement of the whole human race, reject this confusion of ideas. Labor has looked upon capital as its sworn enemy. Capital at the same time rails against labor and labor leaders as the foes of civilization, security, and prosperity, and prophesies coming disasters. We regret this the more because it is clear that capital is the friend of labor, and labor is the friend of capital, and both are, in a greater or lesser degree, dependent on each other. *It is bad management which is the sworn foe to both.* Adam Smith is largely responsible for the antagonism of labor toward capital, through his statement that labor is the source of all wealth. During a century that

saying has been accepted as the final word on that subject, and as an axiom in political economy. A greater mistake was never made, nor one that has had more prejudicial effects on the minds of trade-unionists and working-men generally. Labor of itself can never produce wealth; in fact, it will barely produce sufficient to feed, clothe, and house the laborer. But if labor is well directed, if the fairy of *good management* appears on the scene, all is changed, and labor can produce—does produce—wealth beyond the dreams of avarice."

Unfortunately the writer of this acute criticism does not define for us what he understands by " good management," but I apprehend that most men could define it for him. " Good management," it would be said, " is energetic management, aggressive management, the management that achieves results." Yes, but what results? We all know what is meant by that phrase in the mouth of the clever and driving manager, such as the ordinary corporation puts in charge of its industrial activities. Results with him are measured by the amount of work turned out, and the low figure down to which expenses are crowded. The man who can pro-

duce a favorable report along these lines is a good manager, and would be largely sought after by any corporation in the land. And yet such a man, with all these aptitudes, may be a brute, a tyrant, or a slave-driver. For, though we have abolished the institution which stood for these things, we have not abolished the things themselves. The hard pressure of an inexorable superintendent, the boorish rudeness of an unmannerly manager, the not very scrupulous adroitness of some such official when contracting with a working-man for his labor—these, whether we care to recognize it or not, are, more than any other, the causes of the unrest, the unreasonableness, the organized resistance, the muttered discontent, the secret plottings with which so many of the pages of our industrial history are filled. And yet, if, in the selection of a manager by a corporation which employs large bodies of working-men, the question were raised whether he were a man of equable temper, of self-restraint, of courtesy, of kindly sympathies, and civil speech, it would ordinarily be received by any such corporation with shouts of laughter!

Now, the point which I wish to urge just

here is this, which, I presume, will surprise the average business man or member of a corporation, who is wont to regard the lucubrations of the clergy about matters of business with a good-humored condescension or contempt—as the talk of a well-intentioned but rather feeble-minded person who doesn't know what he is talking about—and that is, that this boisterous laughter is simply not "good business." It is a part of a larger whole; of that disease, in other words, which, in our modern business life, is tending more and more to dismiss the moral element, the element of character, and with it almost altogether the personal element. It is one of the vices of our modern system of manufactures that the proportions of it have all but inevitably dismissed in the work, or its character, the quality of individual touch. A thousand Waltham watches, we are told, will run more nearly together than a thousand Jurgensen watches—if Jules Jurgensen ever made a thousand, which I doubt—but when they are done they are, after all, nothing but machines, while his is a work of art. Now, the task of the modern manager should be to resist this modern tendency, and, most of all, to resist it in con-

nection with its tendency to mechanicalize *men;* and I venture to say that, in the mill or the factory where that consideration has been respected—where men have been regarded and treated as men, and not as machinery; where the daily contacts have been tempered by courtesy, kindliness, and consideration—the effect upon the men and their work has been direct, appreciable, and marketable, in the improved and bettered character of their product. And, to go a step further, when somebody writes an inside history of strikes, it will be discovered how largely labor dissensions have been born, if not of bad faith, then of bad manners. A curious want of vision in our captains of industries fails to recognize the significance to their own undertakings, just here, of two classes of leaders—great generals and great school-masters. With neither of these, from Napoleon to Dr. Arnold, has success been won by relaxation of discipline, which with the latter was as stern and inexorable as with the former. But with both of them, and with all their like, the secret of mastery has been the secret of personal recognition, discrimination, what someone has called "the minor equities," and a respect for them.

If a mill-manager or corporation should care to learn what a master can, by such handling, get out of a man, let him read the Life of Stonewall Jackson.

It is but just, however, to bear in mind that the powers of the most capable manager are necessarily limited; and that, after all, the responsibility for the acts of a corporation rests with that body itself. And this leads inevitably to another aspect of the whole subject concerning which, just now, the Christian teacher must not dare to be silent. It would be an interesting exercise if it were practicable to convene in some great hall the representatives of a dozen great leading corporations in this land, and call upon them, each in turn, to rise in his place and give a perfectly candid and explicit history of the successive processes by which the huge company, or trust, which he represents attained to its present proportions; to tell what weaker rivals were remorselessly and unscrupulously crushed in its progress; what misleading representations were given out to deceive its competitors; what indirect processes were employed conveniently to "bull" or "bear" the stock-markets in its behalf; what doctored statements were furnished

to the public or to the government in lieu of accurate and truthful information; and how far the present prosperity of this or that corporation is due to such processes. "Yes," I hear someone say, "it might be interesting, and to some people mighty entertaining." But what are you going to do about it? Suppose, after such an *exposé* of the methods of some such corporation, you published the names of the corporators and stockholders who are drawing, annually, their huge percentages from these huge trusts and companies, do you suppose that you could persuade them to throw up their stock and disgorge their gains? Human nature being what it is, what *can* you do about it?

It is because human nature *is* what it is that I think that something can be done about it. A people's moral standards are the product of three things: their inheritance of tradition, their atmosphere, and their ideals. Now, in the case of modern America, the inheritance of tradition has been, on the whole, very good. We have, behind us, largely though not, alas, invariably, as witness the Mississippi and Virginia and other repudiations, which here I will not particularize, but, on the whole, a high tradition for commer-

cial honor. An American gold coin has come to be almost, not quite, like an English gold coin or bank-note, which I have never found anywhere—think of it—all round the world to be received for other than its full, and often for more than its full face-value—than which I think there can be no prouder fact, insignificant as it may seem, in the history of that great empire, for it means that it is an empire that always keeps its promises. But an American gold coin also, I say, has come to be, everywhere that travel and traffic have gone, an equally accepted standard of enduring value, and so a witness for honest dealing between nation and nation, and man and man. That may fairly be claimed, I think, to be our national tradition. But it cannot be said to be our commercial atmosphere. That may be tested, I think, by the ordinary converse of commercial people; and if, in describing a transaction in trade or manufactures in which one trader or corporation had overreached and outwitted another, and in which a course of action had been resorted to which, if arraigned in a court of justice, would undoubtedly be designated as chicanery, such a course of action were received

when described as anything else than a piece of pretty shrewd business cleverness; if, still more, it were openly reprobated and denounced as the unscrupulous and essentially dishonest thing that it was—that, I apprehend, would be ordinarily as utterly unexpected as it would be apt to be described as an utterly unwarranted thing. Is it not likely, in other words, that if, under such circumstances as I have described, A. B. indulged in any disparaging comment of an equivocal transaction, C. D. or some other would promptly respond: "Really, my friend, you are a little too good for human-nature's daily use! If you don't approve of our methods, you can get out"?

And—for, after all, that is the *crux* in the whole business—does A. B. get out? Does he utter any protest? Does he seek to induce others to unite with him in such a protest? And, if he does none of these things, does he recognize the immediate tendency and the ultimate issue of such a policy of silence and of acquiescence as he feels himself authorized to pursue? We are impatient, many of us in these days, at the persistent attacks which are being made by a certain class of agitators upon corporations and

corporate wealth. We are satisfied that much of it is inspired by envy, or covetousness, or even worse motives. We are fond of saying, some of us, that modern socialism, with its confiscation of all private wealth, is only another form of piracy or highway robbery, and that the men who lend themselves to such methods and policies of social revolution are criminals *in posse*, if not *in esse*. Well, sometimes we may be right; but quite as often we are wrong. The policy that, in regard to property, and especially corporate property, would expropriate it for the common benefit is born sometimes of a profound conviction that no other policy can arrest the often fraudulent processes by which it has been acquired. The history of the disposal of valuable franchises by the city or the State, under circumstances that leave no honest margin for doubt as to the corrupt influences by which they have been achieved; the frequent coincidence of the expenditure of large sums of money by corporations with certain votes by a legislature, securing for a song certain privileges to certain other corporations—these are things concerning which no one who is adequately informed in regard to them has any

smallest doubt; nor that they have been and are acquiesced in by those who have profited and are profiting by them. And do such persons, or the corporations that act for them, suppose that knowledge of this sort is wholly in their own keeping, and that it never leaks out, or filters down? And if it does, can there be any doubt about the festering and exasperating irritation that it is destined inevitably to produce in the minds of those who, if not directly wronged themselves by such transactions, know that others have been wronged, and that some vast aggregation of corporate capital, with its fabulous annual, semi-annual, or quarterly dividends, represents property which has not honestly been acquired? These are facts, believe me, which no one in all the world is so much concerned in recognizing as the people who, ordinarily, are most indifferent to them. Such persons turn away with an impatient or resentful exclamation against mutterings which, if only they could heed them, might sooner or later create a public sentiment that, in time, would make corporate wealth as secure and corporate management as respected as are to-day the wealth and the business methods of the most

honored and trusted private citizen in any community in the land.

And in this, most of all, is our hope and, incidentally let me add, the pertinency of what I have said in this connection to the whole subject. There is no smallest doubt that, by a steadily and of late rapidly increasing number of people, the growth of corporate wealth and its aggregation in huge trusts have been regarded with increasing apprehension. Without impugning in the smallest degree the honor or integrity of those by whom, in many instances, these results have been brought about, it is widely felt that the mere existence of vast consolidations, whether of men, money, or power in other forms, has in it the possibility of mischievous if not malign results; and the impulse to limit or to restrain such combinations by law is undoubtedly growing, and may easily, ere long, bear fruit. I will not undertake to say that it will be wholly in vain. It may easily be that legislation in some form may restrict, and perhaps altogether defeat, aggressive movements of this sort. But, unfortunately, corporations have in this connection a weapon at their command which has more than once be-

fogged the brain of the law-maker, and sometimes, it is to be feared, corrupted the interpreter or executive of the law, and so made the statute as impotent as though it had never been drawn.

And therefore we must go behind the statute to the men that make it, to those who construe and interpret it; and, further still, to those who would evade or avoid it. And this is true alike of all corporations whatever their aim or purpose. If, here, I have referred only to one or two classes of them, the principles which I have maintained are pertinent to all the rest. Those to whom I speak will have been more fortunate than I have been if, in connection, *e.g.*, with what are called religious corporations, they have not sometimes encountered conditions and policies which it seemed impossible to reconcile with the highest dictates of either honesty or morality, as when the funds of such corporations are made use of for private profit, or the incomes they received derived from property leased or under-leased for infamous purposes. To plead ignorance in such cases is to confess criminality; for such ignorance can be described in no other terms.

Now, the significant feature of a situation so

deplorable as this is that it presents a singular and unwonted inversion of what I may call the usual law of demoralization. As, ordinarily, it operates, that law begins with the relaxation of standards in those who are assumed to be the social and moral exemplars of their time, the disciples of religion and its official representatives, "These in time of temptation fall away," and their lapses are made the excuse or the justification for theirs whose professions and position are inferior or wholly negative. But, in the case of modern corporate mismanagement or breach of trust, I think it could undoubtedly be shown that, where a high standard of administration in religious corporations has existed, it has often been lowered by the introduction into their direction of those who had no other claim to be there save that they had been successful financiers in connection with projects and properties whose history was often not only shady but discreditable. And this has come to pass because, as the author of the "Political Economy of Humanism"* has forcibly put it, "Directorial abuses are not only common, but

* The Political Economy of Humanism, Henry Wood, p. 248.

subtle, plausible, and insinuating, so as to obscure and almost eclipse axiomatic moral principles which are older than the Decalogue. The public conscience is so accustomed to directorial manipulation, and skilful and prolific ingenuity on the part of officials, more especially those of the average railroad, that they are almost expected as a matter of course. To be on the 'inside' is often as good as a fortune assured. Unscrupulous management is regarded only as 'shrewd financiering,' and even as 'brilliant,' so long as it escapes technical and legal cognizance and punishment. Instead of earnest condemnation from the public press, it often calls out criticism only of a flippant or facetious character. Its direct consequences may be seen in great, congested, unearned fortunes; in a lax public conscience, in the considerable distrust with which the foreign world regards the average American railway management, and in the transformation of a legitimate stock-investment business into one of a gambling character." And here follow words which connect the whole subject with that aspect of the larger one which I am discussing, and which are of most tragic truth and import: "It furnishes the text and

vantage-ground of every anarchist, socialist, and would-be destroyer of our present social order." Of that there can be no smallest doubt. The last utterance that I have read from much the most conspicuous champion of social revolution discusses a recent proposition—that of profit-sharing—for drawing working-men and corporations more closely together, as simply a shrewd and clever device on the part of corporations and those who represent them for maintaining a situation in which the working-man may, as heretofore, be effectively deprived of his just earnings.

There are partial remedies for such a condition of things which are easily within our reach, and which it is the duty of good citizenship to demand. A pertinent analogy to the present situation in regard to great business corporations may be found in our more recent administration of public charities; and, since such corporations hold their charter from the State, and are secured in certain privileges by civil enactment, there could be no unwarrantable invasion of the privacy of the individual. It was found, some years ago, that the conditions in some of the public institutions of charity in the city in

which I live were simply monstrous, and that infamies and corruptions had obtained in them for a long series of years, with the entire cognizance and acquiescence of official inspectors and their like. Under these circumstances, a few of us initiated a movement for forcing open the doors of such institutions, and disclosing the acts of their employees to the public eye. I need not describe here the processes, by legal enactment and otherwise, through which this was accomplished. It is enough to say that it has wrought, in hospitals, jails, and asylums, a revolution which will only lose its force and efficacy when the public sentiment behind it grows cold or indifferent.

And here someone may see the pertinency of such an illustration to the subject which I am now discussing. How far are the secret, and furtive, and often deliberately misleading policies and practices of corporate management consistent with the wholesome conservation of public morals? The writer from whom I have just quoted suggests in this connection that, in order to attain an end of such paramount importance as that, the citizen should invoke the law, and that the law should provide, *e.g.*:

"First. The compulsory issuing of monthly reports in a uniform manner, and after a prescribed formula; the correctness of which should be affirmed on the oath of one or more directors, adding thereto such explanatory matter as the management might deem necessary.

"Second. A periodical outside audit by governmental examiners or professional accountants, duly qualified and sworn for this special service, on some plan similar to that used in the case of national banks.

"Third. Construe as bribery the receiving of any commissions or presents by any auditor, purchasing agent, or official, which are given because of official position.

"Fourth. That it shall be illegal, with heavy penalties, for corporate officials to speculate in their own stock, directly or indirectly."

Undoubtedly such legal provisions would be regarded in some quarters as an invasion of private rights, but, as the writer from whom I have just quoted concludes, "A sound political economy teaches that individual freedom must give way to collective freedom, and that the will of society is paramount to personal will."*

* The Political Economy of Humanism, p. 251.

And that consideration it is, when seen in its highest lights, that lifts this whole subject to its true plane. The individual is forever talking of his rights. But a question which takes precedence of his rights is the question, What are his duties? The Being who has been in the world for the purpose of instituting a Divine Society made plain enough to all men the principles on which it was to rest, and they were never those of self-interest, but always those of self-surrender. "Look not every man on his own things," says the Apostle, paraphrasing his Master's law, "but every man on the things of others"; and, if anything at all is clear concerning the mission of Jesus Christ to men, it is that He came to build here the temple of a regenerated society in obedience to the law of righteousness and love; to restore the divine equities; to rebuild the temples of justice, so that the humblest feet might enter into them; and, over all our human activities, to arch the bow of a divine promise to those who loved their neighbors as themselves. Do I hear someone say that such a rule, however excellent it may be in our individual dealings with our fellowmen, has no place in, and can by no ingenuity

be worked into, the fabric of a modern corporation? Why not? At what point does associated action cease to have a moral quality? What is the meaning of those old and clear words, "Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil," and again, "Though hand join in hand, the wicked shall not go unpunished"? It is precisely the implied assertion of this moral irresponsibility on the part of corporations which threatens not only to put the greatest strain upon our institutions, but to destroy in the hearts of the masses all faith in a God who is the God of those who can acquiesce in, or connive at, or consent to be enriched by, practices and policies which transgress the plain principles of common honesty and equity!

And so we see in this connection our high and solemn calling who are citizens. Where corporate action touches the lives, the health, the mental or pecuniary loss or gain of the working-man, it must be brought to realize that it is a steward not only accountable to men, but most of all to God. The hard hand of capital, pressing out of the working-man the utmost of his strength and time, and taking no thought, and giving no means or chance for the betterment

of his physical or mental condition, is not a seemly spectacle, nor a witness to righteous standards.

We are wont, many of us, to consider the demands of wage-earners as oftener than otherwise unreasonable and exaggerated; and yet, in a letter which came to me the other day from a large employer of labor, he said, in connection with some remarks upon a recent issue between workmen and their employers: "As to strikes between operatives and employers, for wages, hours of labor, etc., one of our most prominent silk manufacturers said to me the other day, 'You may set it down as a rule that such strikes are, in nearly every case, the manufacturer's own fault.'" No words of larger promise have been spoken in the whole controversy between corporations and workmen; not at all merely because they confess error in some particular instances, but because, with a single touch, they lift all controversies between corporations and workmen into the light of the eternal equities.

Held there, there is hope for the ultimate transformation of the corporation into a transparent and benignant exemplar of the laws of

human brotherhood. No genius of organization, no cleverness of administration, no vastness of proportions, need fail out of it. The danger of trusts is not in their mere bulk, but in the menace of their uncontrolled and unrestrained bulk. The evil of the corporation is not in its mechanism or its proportions, but in its temper and its morals. In the last analysis, it is a question simply of standards. A great public man in England, bitterly attacked by his political enemies, stood up one day before a vast assemblage that had greeted him with howls and hisses, and, holding up his hands before them all, cried out, "These hands are clean!" and no man dared contradict him! We want such a challenge, and such a corporate honesty and integrity behind it, from those great mechanisms of organized wealth which, despite the dishonor which has stained some among them, have wrought such wonders and earned such honorable repute in our Republic.

But it must come first through the individual. Corporations have, indeed, no souls. But those who compose them have consciences; and these they must bring to the standard of a divine righteousness, to be touched by its quickening

hand; to be illumined by its spirit, and then to bear witness, in kings' palaces, at board meetings, in directors' meetings, not fearing the face of man, because they have heard the Voice of God!

MAN: MEN: AND THEIR MASTER

NO. III

THE STATE

NO. III

THE STATE

IT has been the object of that discussion which this lecture will conclude to bring within the horizon of our thoughts those relations to society, and especially of society under the conditions of modern industrial activity, which man sustains, first, as an individual, and then as voluntarily incorporated for some particular business or calling. But, besides these relations, there is another, not voluntary but largely involuntary, which transcends them both, and that is to the State. Those successive steps which I have already traced, and which are, in fact, the story of civilization, are most of all interesting because they disclose to us how tribes or families, which once had in them no more enduring elements than so many Bedouin Arabs, climbed at last to permanence and power. The family, the tribe, the predatory band of vagrant hunters or warriors,

ceased at last to be nomads and vagabonds, and became a people. And whoever they were, and wherever and whenever this came to pass, it was always, practically, in one way. The chief became a ruler, and the rule became something else, and more than a personal whim. Law took the place of caprice; justice reigned, however crudely and imperfectly, instead of mere impulse; person and property acquired recognized rights; processes were devised for determining and maintaining them; and so, however inadequately and fragmentarily, there were the beginnings of a State.

What are its duties and responsibilities to-day? what are the duties to it of students and scholars to-day? and how far, especially —for that is the question with which, most of all, these lectures are concerned—should those duties which are the State's be enlarged or limited, with reference to the industrial problems of our own time? If to some of these questions we may find no more than a partial answer, we shall, I think, be at any rate somewhat better equipped for grave tasks, and, it may be, grave crises, that are before us; and I do not need to remind you that we shall be

best equipped for such a task if we seek to approach it in the light of the words and the works of One who, whether as a teacher or a citizen, is the most unique figure in history.

And when we do so, the first thing that impresses us is that, when Jesus came into contact with the State, His only attitude to it, its laws, its courts, its executive, was wholly passive and acquiescent. The full force of this fact has been but very imperfectly recognized. Has it ever occurred to you how much more impressive to the popular imagination it would have been had it been otherwise? Before His birth, Joseph and his mother, Mary, went up to Jerusalem to be taxed. But consider the startling and dramatic effect that would have been produced when, *e.g.*, as we read in St. Matthew's Gospel, "they that received the half-shekel came to Peter and said, Doth not your Master pay the half-shekel?"*—that is the Temple tribute, or, as Weiseler suggests,† possibly the Roman census, or poll tax—if Jesus Himself had brushed Peter aside and said, with august

* St. Matthew, xvii. 25.

† See The Life and Times of Jesus, Edersheim, vol. ii., p. 112, note.

and imperial mien, "Most surely not! Shall a sovereign pay tribute to His subjects?" On the contrary, what Jesus in fact does, is, first, to point out with utmost gentleness to Peter and the rest the groundlessness of the claim. "What thinkest thou, Simon? the kings of the earth, from whom do they receive toll or tribute? from their sons or from strangers?" Or, in other words, "If this is a tax imposed by divine authority, shall the Son of Him who imposes it be subject to it?" which was a sufficiently explicit affirmation that His Father's Son could not properly be subject to any such demand; but then, straightway, "But lest we cause them to stumble, go thou to the sea and cast a hook, and take up the fish that first cometh up, and when thou hast opened his mouth thou shalt find there a shekel; that take and give unto them for me and thee." That is to say, "All things are Mine, and are subject to the constraint of My will." In paying this tax, that shall be made plain, beyond a peradventure. "But lest, by a refusal to honor the demand, we cause others to stumble—lest, that is to say, by my disregard of a law which has, here, universal honor, I cause men to associate

with my message and kingdom a contempt for law, see thou that we conform to it."

There is even a much more significant illustration of the same principle in connection with the closing hours of Jesus, the vast and enduring suggestions of which have, I think, been but very imperfectly recognized. Preceding the Crucifixion there were, as a matter of fact, as you will remember, four distinct trials or hearings in the case of Jesus: first, before Annas and Caiaphas; then before Pilate; then before Herod; and then, finally, before the Roman Governor. Has it never occurred to you what a unique and incomparable opportunity was presented, in connection with these, for a display of such power and authority as would have smitten each miserable court, in turn, with abject shame and ignominy if, one after another, Jesus had put them each aside, and gone forward on His way, as King of angels and of men, as indeed He was—"thrones and principalities and powers being subject unto Him"—in sublime and utter scorn of all human tribunals?

But, no; as, one after another, they arraign Him, He has naught to say. As from one au-

thority to another—ecclesiastical, regal, imperial—he is dragged to appear before its fellow, He lifts no resisting or detaining hand, but simply waits upon its pleasure.

We have here, I venture to maintain, a disclosure of the relation of Christ and His religion to the State which lies at the foundation of this whole discussion. Than the corruption, both of Church and State, when Christ entered the world, there is perhaps little that is worse in human history. The one was mercenary, formal, and hypocritical; and the other was cruel, wanton, and tyrannical. And, when moving to and fro amid conditions such as these, Jesus utters no more decisive or revolutionary words than "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's;" "Thou couldst have no power unless it were given thee from above;"—language which, if it means anything, means that the magistrate sits upon his seat under the authority of a divine ordinance, which bids all men everywhere respect the sceptre as the emblem of a divine order—it is impossible to ignore the force of His words and acts.

What, then, it may be asked, was, and is, the relation of the religion of Jesus Christ to the

State? Is it simply to sit by and see wrong done, and sin condoned, and cruelty crowned, and reach out no hand to pull it from its throne? Yes, so far as overt act is concerned, hard as the saying may sound, it is. What the individual citizen is to do, or the people of a State on its way to ruin, under the leadership of blind or corrupt rulers, is quite another question. But for the Church, as the incarnation of the spirit and purpose of the supreme Master of men, there is another and a better way. It is to penetrate the civil order with its divine spirit. It is to transform the secular mind by the spell, in it and on it, of the divine mind. It is to regenerate character, not to break laws. It is, in one word, to re-create the social fabric by the bringing into it of a new soul.

How hard it has been for the Church of God to realize this, I do not need to remind you. It had gone but a short distance upon its way before we find it grasping at external power, and aping the airs and pomps of earthly courts. The latter came before the former; and the steps by which the Church passed from its earlier simplicity to its mediæval tawdriness and secular ostentations exist as enduring warnings

to the disciples of Jesus Christ that the secret of His triumphs does not reside in things outward. But, whichever it was—ceremonial or the greed of power—that, in this noxious and enervating growth, preceded the other, the two marched, ere long, side by side; until the final test of orthodoxy came to be to kiss the Pope's toe, and until to-day in an old Roman city an octogenarian ecclesiastic spends his last days chiefly in bewailing that the world will not call him a King!

Over against a folly so utter and persistent as this, which, wherever its votaries go, in all lands and under whatever pretexts, inspires them most of all in grasping after political power and in intriguing at the back doors of sovereigns and senates, to get the ear and influence the acts of the dispensers of plunder or patronage, stands the figure of Jesus Christ saying to man, "My kingdom is not of this world," and "The kingdom of God cometh not with observation."

But, if not, how, then, does it come? or, to put the question in a form which is still more concrete and definite, What is your duty and mine, as Christian citizens, to the State? I shall endeavor, first of all, to answer this ques-

tion in more general terms, and then with reference, more especially, to those industrial problems with which it is the office of these lectures to concern themselves. In order to do this, however, it is obviously necessary to begin by defining the office and function of the State itself; because, until we have some clear conception of these, it will be impossible to determine our own obligations to that organism for which they stand. We have already seen, be it remembered, that as an individual is an entity, so in a very real, though by no means identical sense, a corporation is an entity. It has a being, functions, responsibilities. And these attributes belong no less to a State. Whether we use that term in its widest or its narrowest sense, whether as describing an empire or a commonwealth, the State is a body corporate, sustaining a more or less clearly defined relation to other bodies corporate, and properly charged with certain definite responsibilities. It must protect the citizen in his just rights; it must maintain relations of equity and comity with its neighbors; it must promote the common well-being by exercising an authority which sometimes transcends and supersedes private rights, as, when, for instance, it

acts under the provisions of the law of eminent domain; it must safeguard the public health, and public highways; and, beyond these things, it may undertake and discharge certain additional responsibilities such, *e.g.*, as that of public education, which experience has proven to be most advantageous to the common welfare.

The question, however, which arises at this point, and which, especially under our modern social conditions, more urgently presses for an answer is, How much farther in these directions may the State wisely go? As one remedy for what many regard as the undue and disproportionate growth of wealth in private hands, it has been suggested, as I need not remind you, that the State should take over certain businesses, as already it undertakes the business of collecting, carrying, and distributing the mails, and conduct them, not for the benefit of certain private stockholders, but for the benefit of the State itself. In Sweden, as one solution of the drink problem, the State has assumed the business of the sale of intoxicating liquors; and with an eye not so much, directly, to the public enrichment because of the profits of such business, as, indirectly, in order to regulate and

restrict it in the higher interests of the consumer. I may not tarry here to discuss the sociological advantages of such a system, which, as we know, enjoys the confidence of many well-informed and thoughtful people. The instance is, at this point, chiefly of interest as raising the same question concerning all businesses. If other things consumed by human society are not, in their nature, of such possibly mischievous influences; if impure in their manufacture, and reckless in their distribution; yet it is, after all, of real and, it may be, very grave consequence that, concerning them, some legal oversight and authority should be exercised. If I may ruin myself by drinking too much bad whiskey, I may poison myself by eating bad bread; and the question of the purity and nutritive qualities of this last may be said to be, so far as the vast majority of people are concerned, a question of immeasurably greater consequence. Still further, it may be urged, if there is force in this argument—and, for my own part, I confess I cannot see how its force can be altogether ignored—why may it not be applied to a great many other interests which are practically those of the whole community, and concerning dangers

against which the community is, in the great majority of instances, wholly powerless to protect itself? No one can at this distance review the reasoning which was employed at the time of the great industrial revolution in England by even the most distinguished representatives of the doctrine of *Laissez-faire*—the doctrine, in other words, that, in the matters, *e.g.*, of wages, hours of labor, child labor, fraudulent adulterations, etc., things must be left to take care of themselves, and the equities involved in them be left to settle themselves under the domain of the great god of Supply and Demand—without owning that Dr. Crozier's burst of scorn, in his "History of Intellectual Development," is not wholly unwarranted when in this particular connection he says:* "Because *caveat emptor* is, in general, a sound business maxim, and because it is expedient that the buyer should be wide-awake, shifty, and self-reliant, and should take the risk in all ordinary business of bargain and sale, John Bright . . . would turn red with indignation at the suggestion that the consumer should be protected by public authority

* History of Intellectual Development, J. B. Crozier, iii., 65–66.

[*i.e.*, that of the State] against injurious or fraudulent adulterations, not only of commodities generally, but of food and drink as well; and, rather than that you should violate the sacred principle of *Laissez-faire*, he would have you carry the whole science of chemistry in your single head; and, when you want to make your purchases, you must either take about with you a complete outfit of test-tubes, gauges, and reagents with which to institute analyses on the spot, or consent to adulterations that should even go the length of poisoning you!"

The *reductio ad absurdum* here, I maintain, is both logical and adequate. If it be the duty of the State to the individual to erect a street-lamp at the corner, so that the thief who may lurk there shall not rob him with impunity; or, if he should do so, to hire a policeman to arrest the thief (if by any miracle of chance the policeman himself be anywhere else than in a neighboring saloon), it is difficult to see how the guardianship, the care, the beneficence, if you choose to call it so, of the State, in behalf of the individual should not, in various directions of a kindred character, be equally extended. If the theory of the State, which, if I understand it,

is the theory of an organized society in which certain functions for the common well-being are taken over from private hands, and discharged by that corporate entity which represents them all—if such a theory, as it has illustrated itself in generations of what we are wont to describe as advancing civilization, is a valid theory, then, at any rate, it is a competent subject for our most serious consideration how far and in what directions we shall extend it. The things that I have named by way of illustration, or things like them, we already do. Why, along the same line should we not proceed farther? We have hospitals for the sick, the blind, the lame; and asylums for the orphan, the incurable, and the insane; why should we not have hotels to which a family with an incompetent woman as a housekeeper—wasteful, indolent, or ignorant—may resort and become the charge of the State? An experienced observer of modern life will tell you that such a situation is one of the most fruitful causes of intemperance. He will prove to you by statistics, if necessary, that, in a great number of cases, the head of a family so situated has, because of it, found his way to the saloon, and become a common drunkard and pauper,

and his family paupers with him; and he will undertake to prove to you—also by statistics—that it would have cost the State less to have taken over this man and his family, and supported them for life, than it has cost it to punish him and his children for their crimes, the product of their father's intemperance; to pay the judge who tried him, the lawyers who prosecuted him, the jury who convicted him, and the cost of the jail and the jailers who imprisoned him.

Or, again, here is a youth who, tempted by the vice of a great city, gives himself the rein in all indulgences that soon breed in him their appropriate crop of loathsome diseases, and end at last in a horrible death. But, before that horrible end, this leprous thing has become a centre of appalling infection; and, in a long trail of disease and physical disability and moral ruin, falling often upon the innocent and unsuspecting, has spread its loathsome length over an indefinite area of misery and shame. All this, the disciples of a new type of socialism tell us, could be prevented by methods which, if the State only legalized and administered them, would be of sure and unerring efficacy.

There is a moral aspect of such a case which I shall not tarry here to refer to further than to say that it involves a distinct endeavor to defeat, by human cleverness, a divine penalty. In its social aspect, however, it falls at once within the lines which condemn a whole multitude of injurious methods of relieving the individual from a sense of *personal responsibility*. And it is just here, as a matter of fact, that we touch that which is, after all, central to the whole discussion. What is that for which you and I and the rest of mankind are here in the world? If it be to create the constitution of a social order from which everything that is individual shall be dismissed, and everything that we possess in common only shall be conserved, then plainly two results must follow: first, that only that shall be conserved which in society is of least value, at any rate according to any standard that is either intellectual or moral, since such qualities are not common, but rare, and must inevitably perish under any system which destroys individuality; and again, that, in the process of creating a social order that transfers responsibility from the individual to the State, you have provided a sure and certain

method of annihilating, through its persistent enervation, that only and supreme force by which States live at all. A man of genius in the financial world said to me, not long ago: "People often say to me in the business world, 'Young men are not, in our experience of them, what they were fifty years ago'; but when I ask them if they are not as intelligent, as industrious, as temperate? they answer, 'It is not exactly that,' and go no farther. They do not quite know how to define a difference of which elderly men are nevertheless quite sensible; but, in fact, there is nothing obscure in the situation; the modern young man *lacks initiative;* he has been, if anything, over-educated and conventionalized." The incident is chiefly of consequence as it points to a cause for the chief difference between the modern young man and his predecessors, as in the matter of resources. His are almost indefinitely greater, and his environment greatly more favorable—and more enervating. Now, when you come to deal with the problem of the State, and what it owes to the individual, here is a factor which you cannot possibly leave out of account. It is entirely possible that the State might, without undue

waste or loss to itself, undertake a great many tasks and burdens which, as society is at present constituted, fall to the individual; but the foremost question in connection with such action must be: what, finally, will be the effect of such a policy upon the individual? You may constitute a social order in which there shall be no rough angles; no unguarded pitfalls; no summons to privation or hardship; but, when you have perfected it, where will you find the *men* to administer it? These are not made that way; and the *automatic* social order remains yet to be discovered!

These considerations, which point mainly in one direction, will nevertheless prepare us for the discussion of those which look in quite another. The State is, or may be, not only a guardian, but an employer; and the principles of its constitution and the function of its life are of supreme interest to-day because they are or ought to be, as great multitudes believe, the matters of her chief concern. In connection, in other words, with the friction of warfare between the capitalist and the working-man, there has risen up a school of reformers who assure us that the only solution of the present social

problem of mutual unrest and hostility lies in a reorganization of labor under the sole control and administration of the State. I need not now enter into questions of original ownership of lands or plants; it is at least conceivable that the State might be the universal lessee—the owner being paid a minimum per cent., and the State fixing the scale of wages, engaging the laborer, and discharging the whole work of contract and oversight. Of course, the chief design in such a system would be to insure continuous as opposed to spasmodic employment, and a fixed rate of wage. But those who have devised this scheme have never shown to us under what system of economics it is feasible. I believe it has been substantially accepted as the final truth, in the matter of work and wages, that these must needs depend upon consumption. But the matter of consumption is beyond the control of the State. If the farmer in Kansas has no wheat to sell, he has no coin with which to buy; no ingenuity on the part of the State can make up to him for a *hiatus* extending over two or three barren years. Production, then, must stop; because consumption has stopped, and, while the State may parry such a situation

by various temporary expedients, it must at last recognize and confront it.

And, even if it were otherwise, that other and still graver alternative which I have already suggested would inevitably occur. "When men are established" (in the employ of the government), says the Financial Secretary of the British Admiralty, Mr. Forward, in his evidence as to State employment of laborers, referring to working-men in the employ of the government, "they have secured to themselves a continuance of employment; and, therefore, the same inducement to diligent active work does not present itself as in the case of the hired men who, if they fail to be industrious, are liable to be discharged." It is the invariable tendency, witnessed to by the enormous cost of public improvements, wherever they have been undertaken by the State, of any such system, to be both prodigal in its expenditure and corrupting in its influence. In countries like England and Germany, where the supervision of public expenditure is far more vigilant than our own, this has been consistently the experience; and, indeed, a conspicuous labor leader in England not long ago unreservedly admitted it.

"An improvement," he says, "must take place in human nature before any wide extension of State or municipal employment of labor would be desirable. . . . Common control without the motive of self-interest can only satisfactorily take the place of sectional control for private gain when public opinion has reached a higher level of morality, and the inducement to discharge one's duties in a manly fashion and from a point of honor is sufficiently strong as an incentive to industry."

It is at this point that the whole question of the bettering of the condition of the working-man impinges upon that of the policy of the capitalist in his relations to the State. How, thus far, for what ends, and in what way, has the capitalist made use of the State, and how far has he invoked its authority or its law-making power in the interests of the working-man? It is when we turn this page in the history of modern industrialism that we come upon some of the least creditable characteristics of our common humanity. That distinguished advocate of the doctrine of *laissez-faire*, in such connections, Mr. John Bright, was the *coryphæus* of a great multitude of capitalists and employ-

ers, to whose blind and selfish policy in dealing with the working-classes the strained and inflamed relations of the two to-day have been largely due. The rapid development of great industries at the end of the eighteenth century "gave rise," as Mr. Geoffrey Drage has impressively pointed out,* "to the two classes of men, the modern employer and the modern workman. The old personal relation between employer and employed, which was possible when industry had been carried on on a small scale, had been almost destroyed. A new race of employers grew up. These were for the most part self-made men who were strangers to the etiquette, family traditions, and moral considerations which impose some restraint on hereditary wealth. The old industrial regulations for the protection of the working-man only hampered the development of the new industry. Their evasion, and, finally, their total abolition, was rendered possible by the fact that the local administration of the law, in the manufacturing districts, was largely in the hands of the employers themselves. Both the judicial system and the administrative system were unfavorable

* The Labour Problem, Geoffrey Drage, chapter iv.

to the working-classes. The employer who exercised the functions of local government was not united to the working-classes by the patriarchal tie which had formerly influenced the squire. . . . Complaints were made on every side of the arbitrary and partial conduct of the justices. The workman was treated with roughness and brutality. . . . The judicial system, although not so directly in the hands of the employers as the local administration and the jurisdiction exercised by the justices, nevertheless showed the same tendency. . . . Under these conditions the working-classes were practically in a condition of slavery. New machinery was continually introduced, and men were constantly thrown out of work, women and children being employed at reduced wages in their stead." In the evidence given before an English Parliamentary Committee, "instances were given of the employment of children who were so young that they had to be carried to the factory, or who were kept awake at their work during the night by blows. Mention was made of children who were so exhausted after their work that the food had to be put to their mouths, and of others who were

sold to the employer by the parish authorities out of the foundling hospitals. The same disgraceful state of things prevailed among the women who were employed in the place of men. Out of 419,590 factory hands, there were 192,887 under eighteen years of age . . . and the number of male adults at work in the factories was less than a quarter of the whole number. The evil results, both physical and moral, were so grave as to be regarded in the light of a national disgrace, and were described as disgusting and brutal." Similar conditions prevailed in connection with "the employment of women and children in collieries and mines, and . . . in the case of men in various other industries such as shipping." Dr. Baernreither, in his volume on "English Associations of Working-men," speaks of the incredible abuses which existed in the shipping industry, owing largely to the greed of unscrupulous owners, and consisting in sending unseaworthy ships to sea in order to make profit out of their loss by means of over-insurance. Speaking of this period, Dr. Baernreither says, in the same volume: "The modern history of the West records, perhaps, no greater plundering of man by man

than that which was then committed against a large number of the English working-class. . . . The unrestricted employment of women, girls, and children destroyed family life, and not only degraded whole classes of working-people to an extent almost past belief, but crushed at once all hope of the rising generation."

I do not forget that, in that heroic movement in England for the correction of these evils, the foremost supporters of factory legislation were Sir Robert Peel, the elder, and Robert Owen, two of the greatest employers of the time. But the man to whom the initiation of the whole reform was owing was Lord Ashley, afterward Lord Shaftesbury, who, being outside of the whole situation, was able to see its colossal evils and mischiefs with an impartial eye, which, until his indignant denunciations roused them, not even these great factory owners were able to turn upon it. The volume by Mr. George Gunton, "Wealth and Progress," to which I have elsewhere referred, furnishes abundant evidence of the same condition of things in our own land, until a few brave men and women in New England recognized its horrors, and strove to rouse

their fellows to its shame. And it is just at this point that the relation of the State to the whole subject becomes plain; because it was not until the employer was compelled by the State to recognize and remedy them that, as a rule, these cruelties and injustices were equitably dealt with. Now, a sound public opinion may operate in two ways. It may act upon the mind and conscience of the employer by convincing him of his duty in the matter of his stewardship of life and character in the persons of his work-people, or it may act upon others, even though he remain insensible to it, so far as to produce in legislation the necessary remedial constraints. Undoubtedly the former is the better way. But the State exists not only as an educator, but also as a wholesome compulsion; and when some of us are disposed to resent the invasions, as we believe, of personal liberty, in present or proposed legislation as to conditions and hours of labor and the like, we must go back in our search for the initial responsibility, to the employer or the capitalist. These represent, or are supposed to represent, our higher intelligence. These hold in their hands, to an enormous degree, the determinative power. These are supposed to

be not insensible to the restraints of a humane chivalry. *Noblesse oblige!* How far do any such considerations seem to have influenced them? And, if they have not, can it be wondered that those whose lives are hard and empty, and whose muscles are prematurely stiff with excessive toil, should remember that they hold in their hands one weapon—the ballot—which can compel the recognition of what they believe to be their rights? When one goes back over the story of the working-man during the century that has just ended, what is the most tragic and impressive fact that it presents for our consideration? It is this, that, all along from first to last, whether in other countries or our own, those things that have been conceded to the working-man for his protection and betterment—the prohibition of child-labor, the sanitation of factories, the restriction of the work-hours of women, and the like—were wrung, originally, from the employer by law, and rarely or never granted voluntarily. It is, indeed, different to-day; and the modern employer of labor has had demonstrated to him by the indisputable argument of experience that restrictive and beneficent measures in behalf of

working-men are "good business," and is himself adopting those measures from economic, if not from benevolent, motives. And so the Apostle's words have found, in the modern industrial world, a new and most dramatic fulfilment; and the law has been a school-master to bring the reluctant employer, little as he may recognize it, to Christ—to the recognition of those great principles, in other words, of human brotherhood, which are of the very essence of the Divinest Teacher who has ever spoken to men.

And thus we come abreast of a very high office of the State in the modern industrial world, and that is as an educator; and, in that connection, of the responsibilities of good citizenship. A review of the history of a year's legislation in any great commonwealth such as this would have, in this connection, a very suggestive value. For it would be found, I apprehend, that the greater part of that legislation was for purposes that are largely commercial or financial—the organization of corporations, the safeguarding of great business interests, and the like; and a very secondary part of it for those higher purposes which safeguard the interest of the

individual, and especially those who are weakest and least able to secure a hearing for themselves. It is for these, supremely, that you and I should be concerned. Wealth can take care of itself; but it is he who, as the toiler at the bottom of the social structure, is most easily forgotten or overlooked, who needs your interposition and mine. And the State, as the law-giver for the weak and defenceless, fulfils its sublimest function.

The bearing of all this upon the question of the character and the competency of those whose office it is to represent the State at its official functions must at this point occur to us, and is of paramount importance. In connection with industrial legislation, it has been found that the most perfect law may be defeated if its execution depends upon a corrupt official; and the history of some of our greater cities and commonwealths is a tragic demonstration of the worthlessness of the best legislation if the execution of the law is vested in incompetent or dishonest hands. It is at this point that public-spirited citizenship has the opportunity to render the greatest service to the State, and, by means of that service, to make the State

the most powerful of all human factors for truth and righteousness. A good law in the hands of a bad man is even a less effective weapon than a bad law in the hands of a good man. But if, instead of either of these, you can create a situation in which good laws are vested for their administration in the hands of good men, then you have a situation which in its essence is divine. For, after all, though we call ours a constitutional and not a paternal government, the most rigidly constitutional government must forever be, in some sense, paternal. It is not self-acting. It is not a mechanism which, whether in its interpretation or its application, is wholly without opportunities for the exercise of a personal discretion; and, under its most strict construction, there may still breathe through it a personal note which is the courage, the equity, or the benevolence of its administrators. How urgent, then, the demand for a system in all our civil service by which the State shall be able to secure for herself her best sons; through whom her laws shall shine as beacon-lights to guide not alone those with wealth or influence, not alone the classes that are privileged or potent, but

the least known, or gifted, or powerful, among us all!

It is along these lines that the State calls for the intelligent service and cheerful self-sacrifice of her best sons, with clearest and most imperious note. We are fond of quoting Mr. Gladstone's eulogium that our Constitution is the most admirable thing of its kind that the art of man has devised. Mr. Gladstone so believed because he conceived of it as doing its work under the guidance of wise hands, inspired by the ballots of a free and enlightened people. But who are they in whose hands, with such precipitate generosity, we lodge this, which is, after all, the final and controlling power? Time was—and that not so long ago—when you, here in this great Commonwealth, were, with the rest of us, substantially a homogeneous people. Three great strains mingled, originally, in the founding of the Republic—English, whether courtier or roundhead; Dutch, and Huguenot; but they were great strains, and they were mutually stimulating and ennobling! But to-day, I had almost said, there are three hundred of them; some of them better and some of them worse, but many of them, so far as their repre-

sentatives here are concerned, pregnant with evil and mischief to the peace of the State and the purity of our institutions. And he who believes in the State as a part of the divine ordering for the well-being of society must recognize that, in view of such dangers, to safeguard its traditions and elevate its official life is one of his most grave and imperious obligations.

For, to lift this whole subject to its highest plane, the State, in its largest and loftiest aspects, stands, with us to-day, for the final impression of our American Christian civilization. Do we appreciate the reach of these words? We set out originally upon our forward march as a Republic with a theory of the measure of its responsibilities which was wholly local and limited. The essence of the Monroe Doctrine was that, as far as practicable, we were to isolate ourselves from other lands and peoples, and to work out our own destinies upon our own soil, and under our own skies. Territorial or imperial expansion had, it must be owned, no place in the dreams of the founders of the Republic, nor in the organic conceptions of our earliest and, as many of us believe, our greatest statesmen. There were reasons for such a position

in the situation, as it then existed, which were natural enough; and which cannot, all of them at any rate, be exalted to that superior realm of motive and character to which, very often, the modern anti-imperialist has attempted to raise them. We were a weak people, originally, and international alliances with other nations—most of them frankly hostile to our form of government, and vastly more powerful, more experienced, and more ambitious, then, than ourselves—might easily have issued in the loss of an independence which had, then, only just been dearly won. And, even if this had been otherwise, we were mainly in possession of a vast continent which was large enough and various enough in its many opportunities and resources for the most exaggerated ambition. Our safety greatly lay, in other words, in minding our own business, and in staying at home to do it.

And, if the conditions in this land had remained what they were a hundred years ago, the same policy would doubtless seem as wise to-day as it did then. I have no smallest intention, let me say, of undertaking the advocacy of a different policy, concerning which there is no doubt

much to be said that, if it does not discredit it, clouds its wisdom with the shadow of considerable and very grave uncertainties. But I am referring to our situation to-day as one in which, like the ordinance of marriage, we have entered upon certain relations " for better or for worse," and in connection with which there have come to the State, in the widest significance of that term, great and grave responsibilities. To bemoan the blunder that assumed them; to berate the individuals, or the policy, that may have been responsible for that blunder is about as wise as the act of a commander on the bridge whose steamer having been run into a net-work of menacing rocks and shoals, in abusing the pilot, instead of helping him to find his way through them. The situation, in many aspects of it, is a wholly novel one. A wise statesmanship, a just recognition of high responsibility will best serve God and the country by seeking to find its way honorably and helpfully to meet and discharge that responsibility.

And this is the more urgent because the extension of the area not only of our national influence, but of our national sovereignty, in-

volves tasks and obligations of a wholly new character to wholly new peoples. It cannot be denied that a large part of what I think I may not unjustly describe as a policy of aggressive imperialism is also a policy of aggressive commercialism. The "market" is, to the minds of a great multitude of people among us, the word, to-day, of most magic import. What can we buy more cheaply in the Hawaiian or Philippine Islands than anywhere else, and what can we sell more dearly there? These, and not other and more serious questions which ought to concern a Christian people, are the importunate interrogations of the hour.

It need not concern us, here, to answer them; but it ought to concern us to recognize what may be involved in a merely sordid and greedy answer to them. "It is scarcely possible"—says Mr. J. A. Hobson, whose admirable volume, if I have not already called your attention to it, I desire to commend to your thoughtful consideration*—"It is scarcely possible for anyone pretending to form a rational conception of life to maintain that the rule of brute-force main-

* The Social Problem, J. A. Hobson (James Pott & Co.), p. 273 et seq.

tained in the phrase, '*Homo homini lupus*,' though no longer applicable to individuals, still holds of nations. But, if it does not hold, some standard of human utility must take its place. How slow has been the dawning of any rational conception of humanity, or of any feeling of a need of it, is testified by the current reluctance of statesmen and publicists to confront this issue. Yet many dim signs of its recognition are discernible. Not only England and America, but nations with a somewhat less developed standard of political morality, like Germany and Russia, are no longer content to justify their territorial aggression and their interferences with foreign nationalities on grounds of mere selfish expediency, but profess a certain mission of civilization; insisting, at any rate, that the attainment of their private ends is accompanied by a gain to the world, and, in particular, to the land or nation which is the object of the encroachment. The British conquest of India, the Russian advance in Central Asia, the opening up of China by the leading European nations, the partition of Africa into 'spheres of influence,' though motived undeniably in the first instance by the particular commercial or

political interests of great 'powers,' are defended also on the ground that, by spreading 'civilization,' they make for the general welfare of the world.

"Now, beyond pointing out a suspicious resemblance which this line of reasoning bears to the exploded argument of the old economists that an 'unseen hand' guides the enlightened selfishness of individual economic men to make for the greatest good of the community, we are not here concerned with the merits of these particular movements. What does concern us is the testimony which the history of modern national movements bears to the need of a scientific sociology. . . . It no longer suffices for each nation to claim to be its own arbiter as to the part it shall play in civilizing the world, and as to the spheres of political, industrial, and moral influence over which it seeks to operate. The mere *ipse dixit* of a nation which professes a mission to annex some portion of the globe should be assigned to the people which can most effectively undertake it. This test, it is true, is eagerly accepted by every aggressive power, which adduces its very power of conquest as best evidence of the superior efficiency required. So

we hear of the 'more efficient' and the 'less efficient' races; and it is suggested that it is 'the destiny,' or even 'the mission,' of the former to 'wipe out' the latter, or to subjugate them. But two fallacies plainly underlie this argument. In the first place, efficiency, for the purpose in hand, is not attested by capacity of conquest, or even by superiority in the present arts of industry. Take the nations of western Europe by their own valuation, and the whole earth is theirs, by indefeasible right, for the purposes of industrial exploitation, and for such political control as is essential to secure this object. Such a course, it is maintained, is good for the conqueror, good for the conquered, good for everybody!

"But sociology, even in its dim beginnings, condemns the fallacious simplicity of such a solution. It finds 'efficiency' a relative term. The 'fittest' individual in some primitive society might be the man who, by force or cunning, was most successful in knocking his fellows on the head, and taking their property. That form of 'fitness' has, however, in most societies, yielded place to quite different forms. So, in the society of nations, we cannot conclude that

a nation is absolutely more fit and efficient because it is stronger in war, or more advanced in certain arts of industry. Such 'fitnesses' may not be the best tests of a nation's ability to 'civilize' another or to develop its material resources; and to turn the world into a cock-pit for the application of these tests may not be a wise economy of the material and moral powers of humanity."

In other words, when a nation is stretching out its hand to grasp more territory, alien races, distant civilizations, or opportunities for the extension of its own, the first question must needs be, What is its competency to discharge any such responsibility, or to administer any such trust? What has it achieved, of its own, which warrants it in saying even to some savage tribe: "The end of life is happiness—physical, mental, and social well-being. You shall have superimposed upon you our ways, our laws, our modes of life, and, most of all, upon the vast majority of you our tasks, and all that they involve?" There is an answer to that question, in the language of a recent traveller among such tribes, which is, just here, perhaps not altogether impertinent: "I have visited," says Mr.

Bryden,* " nearly every native town of consequence in Bechuanaland, and I say unhesitatingly that the people are at this moment, physically and morally, far better off than many thousands of the populations of our great cities in Great Britain, living happier and healthier lives by far than seven-tenths of our poor folk at home."

Is this to demonstrate that, after all, a Christian civilization, and the wise oversight and influence of a great Christian State, have nothing to contribute to pagan lands and peoples? Most surely not; but it is to indicate that, as yet, its own standards—moral, social, industrial —are sorely below a worthy level, sorely below the level of either honorable or adequate achievement.

And so we see our calling as individuals, as citizens, as the children of a great Republic. Authority needs to be re-erected in the heart of the individual, in the counsels of corporations, before the eyes of the nation. We speak of the powers and responsibilities of the great States of Europe—Russia, Germany, Great Britain, and the rest. But to-day the world owns that

* Gun and Camera in South Africa, by A. Bryden, p. 129.

neither powers nor responsibilities such as these are, after all, a match for ours. How shall we use our strength? How shall we learn our obligations? How, most of all, in this great and seething and aggressive industrial life of ours, shall we do our duty to our fellow-man, to our weaker fellow-man, to toilers and sufferers underground, in mills and factories and sweat-shops, and so make ours a State meet to lead and to rule, whether at home or abroad? To that question there is one answer, and only one. We must learn these lessons at the feet of Jesus Christ. We must bring the law of His life, and put it into ours. We must not only affirm the brotherhood of man in Him; we must live it. For then the State—and in the State, the home, the Church, and the individual—shall become the incarnation of a regenerated humanity, and earth, this earth, our earth, here and to-day, the vestibule of Heaven!

FOUNDERS' MEMORIAL

KENYON COLLEGE

All Saints' Day, 1901

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WE REMEMBER BEFORE GOD this day the Founders of these Institutions: PHILANDER CHASE, the first Bishop of Ohio, *clarum et venerabile nomen*, whose foresight, zeal, unwearied patience, and indomitable energy devised these foundations, and established them temporarily at Worthington, and permanently at Gambier; he was the Founder of the Theological Seminary, Kenyon College, and of the Grammar School. CHARLES PETTIT MCILVAINE, the second Bishop of Ohio, rightly known as the second Founder of these Institutions, whose decision of character and self-devoted labors saved them at two distinct crises of difficulty; he builded Bexley Hall for the use of the Theological Seminary; Ascension Hall,

for the use of Kenyon College; Milnor Hall, for the use of the Grammar School; and he completed Rosse Chapel on the foundations laid by Bishop Chase.

We remember before God this day pious and generous persons, contributors, whose gifts enabled the Bishops of Ohio to lay those foundations, and who are therefore to be named among the Founders. We make mention especially of those who have departed to be with Christ, and now rest in Paradise.

Among the many, we name only a few whose gifts are noticeable because of the influence of their character and position:

Henry Clay, whose introduction of Bishop Chase to the Admiral Lord Gambier, of England, initiated the movement in 1823; the Archbishop of Canterbury; the Lords Bishops of London, Durham, St. David's, Chester, and Lichfield; the Deans of Canterbury and Salisbury; Lords Kenyon, Gambier, and Bexley; Sir Thomas Acland; the Rev. Edward Bickersteth, Henry Hoare, Marriott, Pratt, William Wilberforce, Thomas Wiggin, Thomas Bates; the Dowager Countess of Rosse, who aided liberally the Chapel which afterward bore

her name; HANNAH MORE, who also bequeathed a Scholarship which bears her name; and five hundred and thirty others whose names are recorded.

We remember before God the liberality of WILLIAM HOGG, from whom this domain was purchased under the advice of Henry B. Curtis and Daniel S. Norton, with the consent of Henry Clay; the grantor contributing one-fourth of its market-value.

In 1828, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, the President of the United States; Mrs. Sigourney; Arthur Tappan, who originated the Milnor Professorship; St. George's Church, New York, which established a Scholarship; the Rev. Drs. Milnor, Tyng, Bedell, Sparrow, and Keith; the Rev. I. Morse, Dudley Chase, Albert Barnes, John Trimble, William Jay, Abbott and Amos Lawrence, Peter Stuyvesant, Richard Varick, and nine hundred and ninety others whose names are recorded.

These were the first Founders of these Institutions.

Among those who aided Bishop McIlvaine, we mention before God to-day: In 1832, Bishop WHITE, the Rev. Manton Eastburn and Ascen-

sion Church, the Rev. Dr. Cutler and St. Ann's Church, Brooklyn; the Rev. Drs. Muhlenberg and Wing; Peter A. Jay, James Lennox, Robert Minturn, Henry Codman, Robert Carter, Matthew Clarkson, Charles Hoyt, I. N. Whiting, and four hundred and sixty others whose names are recorded;

And in 1835, in England, Daniel Wilson, Bishop of Calcutta; the Bishops of London, Winchester, Salisbury, and Lichfield; the Duchess of Kent, the Duchess of Gloucester, the Princess Augusta, the Duchess of Beaufort, the Earl of Carnarvon, the Rev. Thomas Hartwell Horne, Charles Brydges, John Fox, Jerram, Jowett, Baptist Noel, Dr. Plumptre, Charles Simeon, Henry Thornton, Sir Thomas Baring, Henry Roberts, architect, who gave the plan and working-model for Bexley Hall, with four hundred and eighty-three others whose names are recorded.

These are the second Founders of these Institutions.

We mention before God to-day the gifts of Bishop Gadsden, Bishop Johns, Colonel Pendleton, John Kilgour, the Kinneys, Dr. Doddridge, Charles D. Betts, who founded a fund for the

purchase of theological books; the Rev. C. C. Pinckney, who contributed for fitting up a laboratory; J. D. Wolfe, who contributed to found the Lorillard and Wolfe Professorships; John Johns, M.D., of Baltimore, who left a valuable legacy to the Institutions; Stewart Brown, William H. Aspinwall, and others who contributed to the buildings of Ascension Hall; Thomas H. Powers, Lewis S. Ashurst, John Bohlen and sister, and others who founded a Professorship in memory of the late Dr. Bedell of Philadelphia; Mrs. Spencer; Mrs. Lewis, who partly founded a Professorship; the Rev. Dr. Brooke, the Rev. Messrs. Lounsbury and E. A. Strong, whose efforts brought many valuable contributions to these Institutions; W. W. Corcoran, President Andrews, the Rev. Alfred Blake, and nine hundred and forty others who are also to be counted among the Founders of these Institutions;

And last, the philanthropist, GEORGE PEABODY, the intimate friend of Bishop McIlvaine, who in token of that friendship founded the Professorship that bears his name.

We mention before God to-day, among the donors to this College, WILLIAM E. GLADSTONE,

late Prime Minister of England; the Rev. Canon Carus, and J. Pye Smith; and, in the United States, the Rev. Drs. Dyer and Burr, Professor Francis Wharton, A. H. Moss, John Gardiner, the Rev. Archibald M. Morrison, who founded the Griswold Professorship; the Rev. Drs. Muenscher and Bronson, and others whose names are recorded. And we mention with gratitude Judge M. M. Granger and Peter Neff, who gave the telescope and transit instruments.

We mention before God to-day, with reasons that none can better appreciate than this community, the following, who are recorded among the Founders: the Rev. Marcus T. C. Wing, D.D., who, besides being a Professor in the Theological Seminary, was for thirty years financial agent and book-keeper; R. S. French, who, with the assistance of friends at Mount Vernon and Gambier, provided the full set of nine bells and the clock, and placed them in the tower of the church, with power to ring the Canterbury chimes; Martinbro White, who was for twenty years agent and treasurer of these Institutions, and a man of singular probity and purity.

We mention before God to-day one who has

but now passed from among us, Mrs. Alfred Blake, who founded three Scholarships to bear her husband's name. To her beautiful soul may the Lord grant peace and refreshment in Paradise.

We reverently mention before God this day that venerable and apostolic man now in Paradise, the Right Rev. Gregory Thurston Bedell, the third Bishop of Ohio, who, with the aid of William H. and John Aspinwall, James M. Brown, Samuel D. Babcock, William B. Astor, and other members of the Church of the Ascension in New York, builded the Church of the Holy Spirit for the use of all the Institutions; through him Mrs. Bowler founded the Professorship which bears the name of her husband, R. B. Bowler, who gave a philosophical apparatus, and who, with Larz Anderson, Henry Probasco, William Proctor, and others, founded the McIlvaine Professorship; Jay Cooke founded the Professorship which bears his father's name; Frank E. Richmond founded the Hoffman Library Fund; Stewart Brown builded the tower of the church to bear the name of his son, Abbott Brown. By the same Bishop and his wife the organ was placed in the church

as a memorial of the second Bishop of this Diocese, and the episcopal chair as a memorial of the great Founder; members of St. Ann's Church in Philadelphia completed the endowment of the Bedell Professorship, among them chiefly William Welsh, John Bohlen and his sister, and Thomas H. Powers, who also left a fund in the hands of the vestry of Christ Church, Germantown, for a perpetual supply of specified books for students in Bexley Hall; and Robert H. Ives and his wife, who stated that, desiring not to trammel the Trustees, they placed their fund in the treasury without conditions.

We mention before God to-day JULIA STRONG BEDELL, the wife of the third Bishop of Ohio, who with her husband had contributed most generously of thought, time, and money to these Institutions, and who may truly be said to have been their most munificent Founder. Her gifts during her life were constant and unfailing, and at her death she remembered the College with a large bequest.

We mention with gratitude the successful efforts of the late President of Kenyon College, the Rev. William B. Bodine, D.D., to complete

the endowments, and the gifts that have resulted therefrom, namely: from RUTHERFORD B. HAYES, President of the United States; Peter Hayden, Dr. I. T. Hobbs, the Rev. William Horton, Thomas McCulloch, Samuel L. Mather, William J. Boardman, A. C. Armstrong, and H. P. Baldwin; from John W. Andrews a donation in lands for the foundation of Scholarships in memory of his son; from Columbus Delano the hall which bears his name; from Mrs. Ezra Bliss, of Columbus, a library building, which bears the name of Hubbard Hall, in memory of her brother; and from Henry B. Curtis, Scholarships which from generation to generation foster sound learning. These donors, most of whom are no longer living, we mention before God to-day.

We mention before God to-day James Sullivan Warren, of Boston, and John Sherman, late Senator from Ohio, who left legacies to the General Fund of these Institutions; Job M. Nash, of Cincinnati, who founded the Scholarships that bear his name; and Mrs. Mary A. McBride, of Wooster, who left a bequest to found a Scholarship in memory of her son, a distinguished alumnus of this College.

We mention before God to-day William Simpson, of Sandusky, whose widow gave the William and Mary Simpson Memorial Fund for the restoration of Rosse Hall, which was destroyed by fire May 9, 1897. James P. Stephens, of Trenton, and Mrs. Bedell, together with Alfred M. Hoyt, of New York; John B. Jackson, of Pittsburgh; Miss Tuttle, of Columbus, and others, also contributed toward the rebuilding of Rosse Hall.

We mention with gratitude to-day the liberality of Samuel Mather, of Cleveland; Mrs. Parsons and her brother, Francis B. Swayne, of New York; James P. Stephens, and others, who in the summer of 1896 contributed money for the renovation of Old Kenyon.

We mention with gratitude the gift of James P. Stephens, who has contributed $18,000 to found a Library Fund which is to bear his name; and the liberality of Mrs. Parsons and Mr. Swayne in maintaining the Greek Professorship.

We mention with gratitude George F. Southard, of Paris, an alumnus of this College, who has founded a Scholarship to bear his name.

We mention with gratitude Samuel Mather,

who for many years has contributed annually to the support of Kenyon College; who has provided funds for the heating systems in Bexley Hall, Ascension Hall, and the restored Rosse Hall; and who was the initiator of and largest contributor to the recently raised Endowment Fund of $100,000. We mention also James Denton Hancock, of Franklin, Pa.; the Rev. Dr. Huntington, of Grace Church, New York; the Very Rev. E. A. Hoffman, Dean of the General Theological Seminary; the Right Rev. William A. Leonard, fourth Bishop of Ohio; the Right Rev. Boyd Vincent, Bishop-Coadjutor of Southern Ohio; James H. Dempsey, of Cleveland, and others who have contributed to the new Endowment Fund.

We remember also to-day the most recent gift to Kenyon College, that of the Hon. M. A. Hanna, Senator from Ohio, who has provided funds for the erection of a new dormitory in honor of his wife.

For all these generous gifts of the living, and for the memory of the dead who were the Founders of these Institutions, we give hearty thanks to God this day; ascribing the praise of

their benefactions to His almighty grace, and the glory of His most Holy Name, Who is the God of our fathers and our God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, one Adorable Trinity, for ever and ever. Amen.

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